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ABSTRACT
In October 1923, Turkish nationalists proclaimed the creation of the Republic of 
Turkey. This marked a turning point in a long series of events, beginning with the decline 
of the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century, and continuing through the present day. 
As the Ottoman Empire slowly became the Republic of Turkey, three main ideologies—  
Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkish nationalism—competed for the prime definition, or 
identity, of the Turkish people. Of these ideologies, nationalism would eventually claim 
dominance, though the identity struggle is by no means over, and issues of conflicting 
loyalties trouble much of the Middle East today.
This paper examines some of the identities of the Turkish people and of the nation 
they created. Significantly, these identities have been neither monolithic nor uncontested: 
indeed, it is a discussion of the interplay between competing identities that forms the first 
part of the paper. The second half explores the identity that the Kemalist reforms 
imposed, legislated, and often enforced, as well as the ramifications of this ideology for 
the viability of the new nation of Turkey. This new ideology, particularly as it took the 
forms of modernization and secularism, affected— even prescribed— the corporate 
identity of Turkey as a nation, as well as, to a certain extent, the individual identity of her 
citizens. The degree to which this identity has or has not been accepted continues to play 
an important role in contemporary Turkey (as well as in other states and regions 
throughout the Middle East).
A prime concern in this paper is the roles that competing identities played in the 
development of Turkey as a nation-state, and the often clouded relationship between 
identity and nationalism in Turkey. The conclusion poses questions on the role of values 
in identity, and discusses the practical significance of further studies on identity, 
semiotics, and nationalism.
NATIONAL IDENTITY IN TURKEY
INTRODUCTION
This paper will trace the growth of an idea— Turkish nationalism— and show how 
it and its two major competing ideologies— Islamism and Ottomanism— manifested 
themselves through the end of the Ottoman Empire and the beginning of the Turkish 
Republic in 1923. Alongside the growth of Turkish nationalism came the growth of a 
Turkish national consciousness and self-awareness, blooming into a national identity 
under the Kemalist reforms in the 1920s. The implications of this changing identity, the 
challenges it faced, and the degree of resolution— if any— in the present will close the 
paper, along with a short theoretical discussion on identity.
I begin with a sketch of Turkish history, focusing on the decline of the Ottoman 
Empire and the development of various reform movements, culminating in the 
constitutional government of the Young Turks in the early twentieth century. Further 
reforms were cut off by World War I, after which the war hero and nationalist Mustafa 
Kemal led the nationalist forces through civil war to independence. The long line of 
ideologies, reforms, and intellectuals that had preceded Kemal played an important role 
in Turkish nationalism, providing the foundation on which the Kemalists constructed the 
identity of the new nation. The challenges faced by the Kemalists, the identity they 
supplied, and that identity’s interaction with pre-existing value structures, leads to the 
idea that perhaps a semiotic understanding of values and identity can inform a 
sophisticated and useful understanding of nationalism and contemporary world conflicts.
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3What follows has been gleaned from library research of sources in English, as 
well as three interviews with people who have had direct experience living and working 
in contemporary Turkey.
1. OTTOMAN REFORMS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF OTTOMANISM,
ISLAMISM, AND TURKISM
The Ottoman Empire had its origins in the 11th-century nomadic Turkomans who 
penetrated into Byzantine Anatolia after the battle of Menzikert (1071) in the name of an 
ever-expanding Islam. After the Sultanate of the Seljuks of Rum became the dominant 
state in eastern Anatolia in the late 11th century, it was the ghazis, or warriors of Islam, 
who patrolled the borders of the dar al Islam, or House of Islam, periodically making 
raids into the non-Muslim lands across the frontier. During the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries, the ghazis began to cluster into marchland emirates, partially in response to the 
threat of the Mongols, who forced the Sultanate of the Seljuks of Rum into subjugation in 
the 13th century. But in 1299, Osman Ghazi, one of the ghazi leaders, had the chance to 
fight and expand his territory into what would become the Ottoman Empire. In 1453 the 
Ottomans took Constantinople, and by the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had 
grown to include a vast domain stretching from Eastern Europe to the shores of the 
Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, and extending along North Africa and for hundreds of 
miles down each side of the Red Sea.
The Ottoman Empire was not a Turkish one. Turks were certainly one of many 
groups within the empire, and perhaps even first among equals, but the great size and 
heterogeneity of languages, religions, ethnic groups, and cultures precluded any serious 
identification of Turk with Ottoman. Nevertheless, the “bloodthirsty Turk” lived vividly 
in the European imagination as a constant threat—twice the Ottomans laid siege to
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5Vienna— as well as an embodiment of political, religious, ethnic, and moral difference. 
The Ottomans (as I shall refer to members of the Empire, for now), for Europe, were the 
ultimate Other.1 And conversely, to the Ottomans, Europe represented the worst kind of 
barbarism, lawlessness, and irreligiosity. The two worlds regarded each other with mutual 
suspicion at best, and outright hatred at worst.
The Central Asian Turks, having been overrun by Islam in the ninth century, had 
very little—if any— awareness of themselves as a group other than as Muslims; an 
identity which did not differentiate between them and other Muslims throughout the 
Empire. Nevertheless, a short-lived movement arose in the early 15th century to revive 
old (pre-Islamic) Turkish titles, literature, historiography and particularly language, as 
poets vied with one another to compose purely in Turkish without resorting to the 
(common, at that time) usage of Persian and Arabic words (Lewis 1979:9). But as the 
Empire expanded (particularly with the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 and Syria, 
Egypt, and Iraq during the sixteenth century), this nascent Turkish awareness was buried 
under the new demands of Imperial and Islamic identification, and the emphasis on 
Turkishness dwindled out of existence (ibid.:332).
In fact, of all the peoples of the diverse Ottoman Empire, it was the Turks who 
went farthest in “sinking their separate identity in[to] the Islamic community” (ibid.:329). 
Islam was the ultimate binding force for its practitioners, who made up most of the 
Empire. Significantly, there were Christian and Jewish Ottoman subjects, and these non- 
Muslim Ottomans would play an important though indirect role in the development of
1 “An adequate understanding o f current global conditions and international relations is impossible without 
the study o f Islam as the West’s cultural Other par excellence” (Dashti n.d.: 1; also see Said 1978:1, 70).
6Turkish national consciousness. But as Muslims, the majority of the Ottoman peoples
enjoyed an affiliation stronger than any other:
Loyalty to a place was known, but it was to a village or quarter, at most to 
a province, not a country; loyalty to one’s kin was ancient and potent, but 
it was to the family or tribe, not to the nation. The ultimate loyalty, the 
measure by which a man distinguished between brother and stranger, was 
religion. For the Muslim, his fellow believer, of whatever country, race, or 
language, was a brother; his Christian neighbor, his own infidel ancestors, 
were strangers (Lewis 1979:329).
From its very origins in the seventh century AD, in fact, Islam had been marked 
by its permeation into all facets of the believer’s life. Islam was not merely a religion, or 
a cosmology. It offered a way of life, a suite of morals and ethics, strictures on behavior,
, and, most important, a political structure. In all of this, Islam was similar to the Catholic 
Church during the Middle Ages in Europe: arbiter of law, bestower of economic fortune 
or hardship, maker of treaties, house of the highest moral standards, everything, in short, 
that would determine how the lives of its practitioners were to be lived.
Sultan Suleyman II (r. 1520-1566) brought the Ottoman Empire to its greatest 
heights of territorial expansion, artistic expression, and financial success. Unfortunately, 
the excesses of this Golden Age caught up with the Ottomans shortly, for after Suleyman 
came le deluge. Brought on and continued for a variety of reasons, the ponderous decline 
of the Ottoman Empire was drawn out and at times almost undetectable, though it would 
continue inexorably until defeat and occupation by the Allies at the end of World War I, 
350 years after Suleyman.
The Ottoman Empire’s response to its decline, the slow explosion of scholarship 
to explain it, the reluctant turning to the West as a source of solutions, the countless 
reforms and associated opposition movements, all contributed in their own way to the
gradual development of a Turkish national self consciousness, which would not be fully 
realized until the 1920s (and perhaps not even then, some might argue).
The first sultan to seriously propose and then implement reforms was Selim m , 
whose reign (1789-1807) coincided with the French Revolution. The Ottomans viewed 
the events in France with great apprehension: the secularist separation of Church and 
State was seen as a particularly dangerous doctrine, as was the associated idea of secular 
reason overtaking religious faith as a means of explanation. Nevertheless, Selim m  took 
the significant step of looking to the West for ideas on how to shore up the softening 
Empire. He proposed financial, administrative, and military reforms, most if not all 
modeled after successful institutions of the West. For example, he brought in French 
military officers to train young Ottoman soldiers in the ways of European armies; and he 
established permanent and regular diplomatic communications with Europe by setting up 
embassies in London, Vienna, Berlin, and Paris. The general Western-leaning flavor of 
the reforms did not go unnoticed by conservative elements in the Empire, however, and 
Selim HI was dethroned by a reactionary party in 1807 (Lewis 1979:72).
Selim Ill’s reign had several important results. It was the first serious 
acknowledgment that something was wrong with the Empire, that something needed 
repair. It was the first time for the Ottomans to take the somewhat humiliating position of 
student to European teachers (both literally and figuratively), thus opening the way for an 
increased exchange of ideas between the Ottoman elite and Europe (Ziircher 1993:24-26). 
The Ottoman reaction to these reforms was to emphasize (or re-emphasize) Islamic and 
Ottoman traditional practices and structures, as an alternative to the ways of the barbaric 
infidels in the West. This new emphasis on Ottoman and Islamic identities paved the way
8for the nineteenth-century movements of Ottomanism and Islamism, which are discussed
below. Nevertheless, the die had been cast, and the early nineteenth century saw the
“gradual formation of a group of reformers with a certain knowledge of the modem world
and a conviction that the empire must belong to it or die” (Hourani 1970:43). It was this
thread of westward-looking reformers and their successors that would characterize
Ottoman reforms for the next century..
Selim m’s cousin, Mahmud II, became Sultan in 1808. By the 1820s he too was
instigating reforms, a sure sign that despite opposition, the decline of the Empire and
subsequent need for change was only becoming more obvious. Mahmud II continued
Selim’s emphasis on the West as a necessary if distasteful model (by now, as Europe led
the world in exploration, military might, and economics, it was hard to doubt the efficacy
of Western institutions; see Lewis 1996:56; also see Hanioglu 1995:7-10). But Mahmud’s
reforms in the military, educational methods and structures, imperial administration,
economics, and communications, all were less successful than perhaps he and the other
reformers had hoped for:
[Their] task was appallingly difficult. Even when the forces of reaction 
had been beaten into submission, there was still the problem of finding 
suitable men to devise and apply the reforms. The Sultan himself, strong- 
willed and violent, was profoundly ignorant of everything Western. There 
were still lamentably few of his countrymen who were any better 
placed....Muslim fanaticism prevented Mahmud from inviting more than a 
small number of foreigners, and from making much use of those who did 
come....
...[The reforms were plagued by the] increased cost of a 
Westernized style of living; the continuing insecurity of tenure and 
property; the chronic financial disorders of the reformist ministries, and 
above all, the breakdown, without replacement, of traditional moral 
standards (Lewis 1979:104).2
2 Edward Said’s strongly-worded criticism of Bernard Lewis notwithstanding (Said 1978:315-320), Lewis 
in this instance appears to be simplifying somewhat what was undoubtedly a more complex issue: Mahmud 
was faced with strident resistance to the ideas he felt were necessary to the Empire’s very survival; many
Other than a continued exhortation to look Westward for reforms,3 the main 
contribution of Mahmud’s reign was to make such reforms less horrifying to the 
Ottomans. This was a change only of degree, and a small one at that: many if  not most 
Ottoman citizens, understandably, remained opposed to any suggestions to change their 
way of life, their laws, their economics, which— after all— had been in place for 
generations.
Meanwhile, throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a 
combination of invading European armies and internal minority uprisings made 
disturbingly clear the weakness of the Empire while at the same time hindering the 
reformers’ attempts to combat that weakness. Emboldened by the eminently viable 
nationalism of nineteenth-century Europe, as well as by the success of the Greeks, who 
had gained their own independence from the Ottomans after a revolt in 1821, many sub- 
Ottoman groups (Serbs, Croats, Bulgarians, Armenians, Arabs, Kurds, and others) began 
wondering if independence might not be the solution to the twin problems of Ottoman 
subjugation and the decline of the Empire (see Ahmad 1994:15). These early nationalist 
movements would eventually boil over into full-fledged wars for independence, though it 
would take several generations for this to happen. Meanwhile, the inklings of sub- 
Ottoman nationalisms merely served as another reason to strengthen the Empire through 
social and economic reforms.
felt that his reforms were implicit if  not direct violations o f cultural and moral norms by which they had 
been living their entire lives. Certainly there was more to it than Muslim fanaticism and a strong-willed 
Sultan.
3 Though not just to the West; Russia’s Peter the Great was held as a model of how a determined ruler 
could combat and overcome the backwardness o f a state (Lewis 1979:103).
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Mahmud’s (and Selim’s, for that matter) reforms had been weakened by the 
sweeping nature of their approach: other than a general desire to preserve the empire and 
overhaul amorphic institutions and morals, there was little concrete definition of problem 
or solution. But as the nineteenth century went on, Ottoman reformers began to more 
specifically outline problems as well as solutions, and the reforms of the Tanzimat period 
during the mid-nineteenth century were aimed at particular and concrete social and 
economic issues.
In the mid-nineteenth century, a “new bureaucratic class...[who], though loyal to 
the sultan and the Ottoman dynasty, possessed a higher sense of loyalty to the state4 
which [they] no longer saw as being manifested only in the person of the sultan” (Ahmad 
1993:25), initiated a 40-year period of reform— the Tanzimat— which “promised 
[changes] in conscription, taxation, and justice” (Davison 1990:24). But here too, much 
like earlier reforms, the Tanzimat changes were flawed by poorly-planned 
implementation, resulting in overlaps and redundant institutions: just the sort of 
overweight and outdated bureaucracy the reforms were supposed to remove. Establishing 
new political, administrative, legal, and educational institutions without abolishing the 
old ones, the Tanzimat reforms had a hesitant air, which led to “a series of dichotomies in 
almost every field of life” (Berkes in Gokalp 1959:17).
And overall, the changes did little to slow the decline of the Empire: “if from 
1000 to 1255 [1592 to 1839] the Empire had advanced on the road to decline at the pace 
of a two-horse carriage, from 1255 to 1285 [1839 to 1869] it had rushed with the speed of 
a railway-train” (Ziya Pasha 1869 quoted in Lewis 1979:172). Nevertheless, many of the
4 Significantly, this loyalty to the Ottoman State above all else would be a precursor to the Ottomanism I
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ideas proposed by the Tanzimat reformers were to see light again during the Kemalist
reforms half a century later. For example, there began a secular trend in education, as
non-religious state schools were established (in addition to traditional Islamic and millet-
based schools); these secular schools were to bring forth many of the nineteenth-century
reformers (Ztircher 1993:65-66). But in addition to these foundations for Kemal to build
on, there also developed a determined resistance to anything Western, a defensive stance
that perhaps would not have been so strong in the absence of Westem-style reforms.
The political, social, and economic changes [the reforms] involved seemed 
to offer some kind of threat to the interest of almost every group in 
Turkish society; to almost all they appeared as a triumph over Islam of the 
millennial Christian enemy in the West. For the reforms were basically the 
forcible imposition, on a Muslim country, of practices and procedures 
derived from Europe....Military defeat and political humiliation had indeed 
shaken the torpid and complacent trust of the Turks in their own invincible 
and immutable superiority, but the ancient contempt for the barbarian 
infidel, where it yielded, often gave place to rancour rather than 
emulation....[Furthermore,] the granting of equal status to non-Muslims 
within the Empire was to many the final insult and outrage (Lewis 
1979:127-128).
The granting of equal status to non-Muslims occurred in 1855, as the poll tax for 
non-Muslims was abolished and Christians were allowed to enter the army and civil 
service. This period marks the beginnings of an active interest in Ottomanism, which 
preached unity among all members of the Empire by virtue of their status as Ottoman 
citizens. This Ottoman identity was to override local ethnic-national sentiment as well as 
religious cleavages within the Empire as well as Islam itself.
The principle of Ottomanism first appeared during the Tanzimat years (1839- 
1876), as the leaders of the reforms, “who believed that European ideas of constitutional 
monarchy and equality of all citizens regardless of ethnicity and religion could be
discuss below.
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introduced top-down, were idealists aiming at not a Turkish but an Ottoman identity” 
(Mehmet 1990:115; also see Go5ek 1996:124ff.). The principle of Ottomanism would be 
the first— and ultimately, least effective— of the three ideas that competed for the identity 
of the citizens of the Ottoman Empire. Constructed as an attempt to bring together the 
diverse peoples of the Empire under one Ottoman roof, Ottomanism was weakened by 
the very heterogeneity it was employed to combat: it was the heady sub-Ottoman 
loyalties of religion, ethnic group, language, and culture that presented identities more 
compelling and more effective in getting things done than the flaccid and shallow notion 
of Ottomanism. What Ottomanism had in its favor, as opposed to Islamism and Turkish 
nationalism, was that it was the defining principle of the Ottoman Empire. Abandoning 
Ottomanism would have also meant abandoning the Ottoman Empire, something that no 
one was willing to do.
The millet system played a crucial role in strengthening these sub-Ottoman 
affiliations. The millets had begun as fairly autonomous religious communities within the 
Empire; the Ottomans were content to let Jews, Orthodox Christians, and Armenians live 
together in discrete groups as long as they paid their taxes and didn’t make trouble. But 
this religious tolerance, so appealing to 20th-century liberal notions of freedom, would 
prove to be a severe mistake for those wishing to hold the Empire together. The trouble 
was that although they were originally intended as separate religious enclaves, by the 
nineteenth century, the millets were virtually independent ethnic groups. Many of the 
religious divisions among the Empire’s subject peoples were also ethno-linguistic 
divisions (Karpat 1982:142); by establishing and maintaining a segregation along these 
religious lines, the Ottomans were (unwittingly, perhaps) encouraging ethnic divisions,
13
ethnic autonomy, ethnic independence. Such a situation of discrete religious groups, 
Braude and Lewis (1982) point out, should not be considered to be the result of universal, 
large-scale, planned tolerance, but rather “a series of ad hoc arrangements made over the 
years, which gave each of the major religious communities a degree of legal autonomy 
and authority with the acquiescence of the Ottoman state” (ibid.: 12-13). Ideally, tolerance 
was preached by the premises of Islam; a tolerance particularly towards fellow “peoples 
of the Book,” as the Jews and Christians were termed. But the fact that this tolerance had 
to be legally and administratively established suggests, to a certain extent, a de facto  
intolerance.
Viewed with hindsight, the development of nationalism from the millets5 seems 
unavoidable: these were groups of people living as subjects of a sometimes oppressive 
autocratic regime, a regime which encouraged and even required them to live and work 
with others of the same ethnic, religious, political, and linguistic affiliations.6 Meanwhile 
the Empire was crumbling and the independent nations of Europe were not only enjoying 
terrific successes but offering economic and moral assistance to the millets. It is hard to 
imagine a more favorable environment for nationalism. The sub-Ottoman nationalist 
movements would play a crucial role in the development of Turkish nationalism, though 
this would not occur until very late in the 19th century. For now, they just threatened 
Ottomanism and the solidarity of the Empire (Karpat 1982:163).
5 The word millet has held many meanings over the years, at once reflecting the changing use of the term, 
the changing identity o f those it applied to, and the flexibility of language to deal with such changes. Millet 
has meant “nation,” “the Islamic religion,” and “religious community,” (Lewis 1979 347, 334-336. Also 
see Davison 1977:33).
6 This was borne out after many of these groups achieved independence during the nineteenth century. 
Their “group identity, internal cohesion, and socio-political values as a nation were determined by their 
long experience in the millet system” (Karpat 1982:141).
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Besides Ottomanism, a second competitor for the identity of the people was 
Islamism, which called upon its members to join together under the banner of Islam, 
regardless of ethnic, political, or territorial ties. Sultan Abdulhamid (r. 1876-1909) 
stressed his role as not just Sultan of the Empire, but Caliph, or leader, of all Muslims, 
wherever they lived. As Muslims were repeatedly humiliated by Christian successes 
during the nineteenth century, particularly its second half, this doctrine of pan-Islamism 
became more and more compelling. Abdulhamid favored it because he could use it to 
gather support from traditional elements against liberal reformers and the twin evils of 
nationalism and secularism. “The task was to drive out the foreign [Christian] invaders, 
abolish foreign concessions and immunities, restore the true Islamic faith— and, some 
added, to reunite all the Muslims in a single state, under its lawful sovereign, the Caliph” 
(Lewis 1979:342). This official policy of pan-Islamism was seen as more practical, more 
workable, and more likely to succeed than the idealistic Ottomanism.7
The third force in fostering group identity was Turkism; or, more exactly, pan- 
Turkism which later became local Turkism, or Turkish nationalism. Although it was the 
last of the three to develop, Turkism would eventually bloom into Turkish nationalism—  
and nationhood—in the 1920s. But during the middle nineteenth century, Pan-Turkism, 
or Pan-Turanianism as it was sometimes called, found expression as an interest in 
Turkish (largely pre-Islamic) antiquity and the ways in which the Turkish race spread 
across Eurasia. The new science of Turcology became popular, and the group began, 
somewhat tautologically, to define itself by studying itself: We are that which we study;
7 Kemal Karpat (1982:31) links the growth o f pan-Islamism in the late nineteenth century to the recent 
successful unifications of Italy and Germany, based on what the Ottomans considered to be the same sort of 
“primordial instincts” as those o f Islam.
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we study to know ourselves better. Eventually this cultural pan-Turkism would take on a 
political aspect.
These three forces— Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism— are tangled 
throughout Ottoman (and Turkish) history of the nineteenth and early 20th centuries. And 
the story of their struggle, debate, and eventual denouement is the story of the becoming 
of the Turkish nation.
2. IDEOLOGUES OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Critics of the Tanzimat reforms included a group that arose in 1867, calling
themselves the Young Ottomans and calling for an Ottoman parliament to check the
abusive power of the ministers; a power which, they felt, had done nothing to slow the
Empire’s slow decline. One of the most outspoken of these was Namik Kemal (1840-
1888), who favored a sort of Islamic modernism, in which the troubled Empire would
take on the material aspects of the (clearly successful) Western civilization, while
retaining their Islamic spirituality, morality, and traditions. He envisioned an Ottoman
parliament and the accompanying Islamic modernism as a middle road between out-and-
out modernism and secularism in the face of massive popular opposition on the one hand,
and strict adherence to the sharia above all else as the means for eternal salvation
regardless of the worldly costs, on the other. In fact, he did not see any contradiction
between Islamic moral and religious principles, Ottoman political structures, and Western
civilization. He favored pan-Islamism as the only real bond for the otherwise diverse
peoples of the Ottoman Empire, but largely it was a cultural pan-Islamism he had in
mind, rather than a political grouping.
«
It is hard to place Namik Kemal’s ideas in Islamism, Ottomanism, or Turkism; 
though the latter had not really developed as a political rallying point when he was 
writing in the mid- to late-nineteenth century. The difficulty in classifying Kemal lies in 
the fact that he himself did not distinguish between the Ottoman world and the Islamic
16
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world. For instance, his call for pan-Islamism as the primary identity implies the
congruency of the Ottoman Empire as a matter of fact:
Since the Caliphate is here [in the Ottoman Empire], and since...in the 
suitability of the place and the readiness of the people in nearness to 
Europe, the present home of civilization, in wealth and in knowledge, this 
country is the most advanced of all the Muslim lands, this union of which 
we speak will surely have its centre here....When that happens, the light of 
knowledge will radiate from this centre to Asia and Africa. Facing the 
balance of Europe, a new balance of the East will come into being (Kemal 
1872, quoted in Lewis 1979:341).
Having established that Westem-style reforms were necessary, Kemal tried to 
reconcile them with Islamic tradition, to find precedents in the Islamic past (Lewis 
1979:144), so that his proposed changes on such things as human rights, parliamentary 
government, and political rights of the citizen (to name a few), were seen not as a 
capitulation to the Western ideals but rather as a return to an older, more pure form of 
Islam. He argued that “all that is best in European civilization derived from or could be 
paralleled in classical Islamic civilization, and the Muslim, in adopting these things, was 
returning to what was deepest and most authentic in his own tradition” (Lewis 1979:142).
Namik Kemal was not the only ideologue to find the roots of reforms in the 
Islamic past. Mohammed Abduh, writing in the late nineteenth century, also struggled 
with the tension between a necessary (he felt) modernity and an equally necessary 
Islamic tradition. Like Kemal, Abduh’s solution was to maintain Islam as the basis of 
society, but to reconcile it with modem thought. Islam, he felt, “could be the moral basis 
of a modem and progressive society (Hourani 1970:140). This wasn’t just an abstract 
possibility but a concrete necessity if the Muslim world was to remain— or become— a 
key player: “the Muslim nations could not become strong and prosperous again until they
18
acquired from Europe the sciences...and they could do this without abandoning Islam” 
(ibid.: 151).
Recall that one of the legacies of the Tanzimat reforms was the redundancy of 
traditional Ottoman-Islamic and new European-style institutions and, by implication, two 
competing world views. Abduh intended his work to “convince Muslims with a modem 
education that they could still be Muslims, and to save them from having to live in two 
worlds at once, one derived from the principles of Islam and the other from those of 
European thought” (Hourani 1981:184).
Abduh’s viewpoint, like that of Namik Kemal, indicates that a certain amount of 
the ideological discussion during the mid- to late-nineteenth century, and to some extent, 
of the twentieth century as well, cannot be definitively placed into Ottomanism,
Islamism, or Turkism. After all, these developed at different times, and were each 
complex enough to contain a wide variety of viewpoints, to the extent that any division is 
somewhat artificial. In other words, the thinkers of the time rarely if ever pointed out (for 
example) that they were espousing Islamism instead of Ottomanism. They wrote and 
taught what they felt was right and possible; today scholars divide their thinking into 
these three categories (see Ziircher 1993:132). Another important consideration may 
seem somewhat obvious: we have the benefit of hindsight. We know that Turkism, 
despite a later start than the other two, eventually bloomed into Turkish nationalism and 
overrode the other two. But if it had been Ottomanism or Islamism that was the victor, we 
could just as easily find early signs of each of them in the debates of the nineteenth 
century.
19
Abduh and Kemal, along with most of the other ideologues of the nineteenth 
century, struggled with the friction between tradition and modernity. Some people felt 
that the problem was with the Ottoman Empire; others felt that Islam itself had to be 
reformed. Nevertheless, many of the questions were the same. By the early nineteenth 
century, “[fjinding themselves the target of conquest and colonization, Muslims naturally 
began to wonder what had gone wrong....Educated Muslims, chagrined by the newfound 
potency of their European rivals, asked: What are they doing right and what are we doing 
wrong, or not at all?” (Lewis 1996:56).
Ahmed Vefik Pasha (1823-1891) is generally considered the first scholar to stress 
a Turkish group identity within yet actually separate from the Ottoman identity. This 
period saw the beginnings of (intellectual) pan-Turkism, as Vefik Pasha stressed “that 
Turks and their language were not merely Ottoman, but were the westernmost branch of a 
great and ancient family stretching across Asia to the Pacific” (Lewis 1979:347; emphasis 
added). In this sentence, although it is caged in academic terms (Vefik Pasha wrote on 
history and linguistics) we may glimpse some early pride in this Turkishness, as opposed 
to being “merely Ottoman.” Another pan-Turkist scholar, Suleyman Pasha (d.1892), 
wrote a general history which stands out as the first work of (modem) Turkish 
historiography to examine the pre-Islamic Turks (Lewis 1979:347).
This focus on the Turks as an object of study had the effect of further defining 
that object, and new feelings of Turkish self-awareness began to develop. In addition to 
scholarly attention, irredentist Turkish movements (particularly in Russia and Central 
Asia) outside the boundaries of the Empire also began to draw attention to the 
possibilities of pan-Turkism.
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The Ottoman reaction to Balkan separatism, the Tatar revolt against 
Russian pan-Slavism, the response of Turkish and Tatar intellectuals, the 
nourishment of Turkish pride by Turcological discovery— all these, at a 
time of Ottoman defeat and Muslim abasement, combined to encourage 
the growth of Turkism, of the new political movement based, not on a 
dynasty, a faith, or a state, but on a people— the Turkish people, in its vast 
territories extending from Europe to the Pacific (Lewis 1979:348).
But Ottomanism was still a potent force— after all, it had the existing legitimacy
of the Ottoman Empire behind it— as was Islamism, which had its own ancient
legitimacy. It is too easy to simplify history into discrete ideological periods, with
starting and finishing dates and a list of key figures, like toy soldiers, lined up in each. In
the Ottoman Empire during the mid- to late-nineteenth century, the currents of these three
ideologies swirled and blurred across the decades, and it was not until the declaration of
the Republic of Turkey in 1923 that Turkism was seen to be victorious, and only a murky
victor at that: although Ottomanism has fallen away, Islamism remains a potent force in
today’s world.
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897) was one of the most articulate and forceful 
proponents of renewed Islamism as the solution to the decline of the Muslim world. 
Nationalism, he admitted, plays an undeniably important role in the world. But the soul 
of the people should remain Islamic throughout the convulsions of revolution and 
independence. These political upheavals were no threat to Islam, which, al-Afghani 
maintained, should stand as the primary identity of the people— and only after that would 
come affiliations of nationalism or patriotism (Lewis 1979:342; Hourani 1970:115ff.). 
“For Muslims,” al-Afghani felt, “no sort of national solidarity, not even patriotism, can 
replace the bond created by Islam. Real unity, in a Muslim nation, rests on common 
religious conviction” (Hourani 1970:119). Two points are important to note here. The
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first is that for al-Afghani, the Ottoman Empire was not even an issue, which shows how 
far its decline had progressed by the mid-nineteenth century: even a generation before, 
the continued existence of the Empire was a given assumption. The second point is that 
al-Afghani’s was not necessarily a call for pan-Islamism, but rather, a conviction that 
whatever other identities a group of people held, their strongest bonds should be those of 
Islam. An Islam which, moreover, needed to be reformed and purified from the taint of 
secularists and Westem-style reformers (Yapp 1987:219).
Sultan Abdulhamid, who came to power in 1876, adopted a form of pan-Islamism 
during the last years of the nineteenth century. This won him the support of Ottoman 
Muslims (as well as non-Ottoman Muslims, for that matter) against the numerous liberal 
opponents of his autocratic rule, emphasizing his role of Caliph and thus leader of all 
Muslims. To defy the Sultan was to defy Islam. Nevertheless, such defiance did occur, 
largely in the person of “Western-educated, westward-looking younger intellectuals” 
(Lewis 1979:344), who viewed pan-Islamism as a shallow anachronism that, no matter 
how morally appealing it might be, simply could not stand against the Christian West.
In 1897, as Abudlhamid was pursuing his pan-Islamic policies and a group known 
as the Young Turks lived in exile from the Empire, working for the “salvation of the 
empire and the restoration of the constitution of 1876” (which Abdulhamid had 
suspended) (Yapp 1987:183), a writer named Mehmed Emin published a book of poetry 
written in the meter and language of popular vernacular Turkish, rather than the formal 
Ottoman style. In this volume of “folk” poetry we may distinguish the first instance of 
political pan-Turkism: “I am a Turk, my faith and my race are mighty”; and later, “We 
are Turks, with this blood and with this name we live” (Emin 1897 quoted in Lewis
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1979:343). For the first time, the Turks were portrayed as more than just a past object of 
study that had existed in the past; they were a vibrant group living in the present and 
proud of their identity.8
This was not to say that Emin advocated “Turk” as his primary identity: he was a 
devout Muslim and Islam remained his first loyalty. But what he had done was introduce, 
with the new use of the word Turk, “a new concept of identity...into the collective self- 
consciousness of the Turkish-speaking Ottoman Muslims” (Lewis 1979:343). Along with 
fellow pan-Turkist Yusuf Akgura (discussed below) and others, Emin founded the journal 
Turk Yurdu (Turkish Homeland), “which rapidly became the organ of a more systematic 
and political form of Turkism” (Lewis 1979:350).
Yusuf Akgura (1876-1933) published a pamphlet in 1904 which also outlined 
pan-Turkism as a separate— and more viable— movement from Ottomanism and 
Islamism, a movement that could stand successfully against European aggression (Berkes 
in Gokalp 1959:20). After discussing and then discarding first Ottomanism as an 
unrealistic pipe dream, and then Islamism as too dispersed to counter Christian (Western) 
opposition, Akgura called for a “Turkish national policy based on the Turkish race” 
(Ak?ura 1928 quoted in Lewis 1979:326-327), not making a distinction between “the 
dominant Turkish race within the Ottoman Empire” and “the many millions of Turks, in 
Russia and elsewhere, beyond the Ottoman frontiers” (Lewis 1979:327). (There is no 
clearer outline of pan-Turkism than this, and because Akcura’s ideas of the Turks had no 
clear territorial demarcation, it is too early to call this Turkish nationalism.) Akcura’s call 
for a new identity with its foundation in the Turkishness of its members was, compared to
8 It is also significant that Emin here proudly adopts the term ‘Turk,” previously an insult.
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Islamism and Ottomanism, “equally grandiose, but perhaps more effective and more
modem as well as more useful to the Turks” (Berkes in Gokalp 1959:20).
Ak9 ura and the other pan-Turkists did not go so far as to call for a national group
with its identity rooted in the Turkishness of its members, though they did loudly and
proudly demarcate themselves as a group separate from Muslims or Ottoman citizens.
Some agreed with the pan-Turkists on the efficacy of a Turkish self-
consciousness, but remained attached to the traditional Ottoman political structure,
maintaining that the Empire “could be saved and eventually reformed by giving it a
Turkish national character” (Karpat 1973:110). Others felt that the pan-Turkists had not
gone far enough in their calls for Turkish solidarity. Ziya Gokalp (1876-1924) played a
vital role in shepherding the transition from the pan-Turkism of the late 19th century to
the Turkish nationalism of the 1920s. It was not until Mustafa Kemal led the war for
independence against first the Greeks and then the occupying Allied powers that Turkish
nationalism took on the explicitly territorial tone that would distinguish it from the more
general pan-Turkism of earlier years. But Gokalp’s pre-World War I writings served to
strengthen the conviction that the Turkish character was capable of forming into a nation.
Niyazi Berkes, who translated and edited a volume of Gokalp’s writings, summarized the
recurrent theme as
how the Turks should adopt Western civilization, and how this effort 
should be harmonized with the Turks’ two historic traditions, i.e. their 
Turkish and Islamic backgrounds; or, in other words, what the Turks as a 
nation and Islam as their religion would look like under the conditions of 
contemporary civilization (1959:13).
Gokalp was careful to make clear the distinction between culture and civilization. 
Culture, he maintained, was linked to the pre-Ottoman and indeed pre-Islamic practices
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of Turkish folk culture— art, music, poetry. This Turkish culture, he argued, must be 
maintained. But the cumbersome, intricate, and ultimately crippling Ottoman civilization 
should be replaced with the more modem and more effective one of the West, including 
“positive sciences, industrial technology, and social organization [division of labor]” 
(Gokalp 1959:266). Western culture, with its attendant excesses, immoralities, and lack 
of Islam in general, was to be avoided: “[W]e have to be the disciples of Europe in 
civilization, but entirely independent of it in culture” (ibid.:250) he wrote in 1917, as 
World War I was grinding to a close and the curtain seemed certain to fall on what was 
left of the Ottoman Empire.
Although by this point— the early 20th century— pan-Turkism had yet to fully 
metamorphize into Turkish nationalism, it was already developing a territorial aspect 
(thanks largely to war and independence in the provinces), which was only made stronger 
by ethnic and linguistic identification across the region; a region that was, after all, what 
was left of the decrepit Empire. Ottomanism, on the other hand, lacked the objective 
unifier promised by pan-Turkism. Ottomanism had no common linguistic identity on 
which to draw, no discrete territory, no ethnic homogeneity— nothing besides the 
increasingly desperate insistence on a common Ottoman state over all other loyalties. 
Furthermore, this Ottomanist identity, largely a political one, paled in comparison to the 
more immediately obvious traits of language, fatherland, ethnicity (Hourani 1970:281).
By the early 20th century, then, there was a great deal of argument over what 
would become of the Empire. Some few suggested a return to old structures and 
institutions; others argued that sweeping reforms were the only solution; still others felt 
that slow and moderate change was all that was needed. But the theme that most clearly
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stands out— even after the Young Turk revolution of 1908— is a great uncertainty over 
the nature of what the people were arguing for, or what they were disagreeing over.
Either way, and despite the fact that there was by this time a fairly well agreed-upon 
group of Turkish people, it was disturbingly unclear what the nature of that group was; if 
they were to be an Islamic nation, an ethnic group within the Ottoman Empire, a group of 
Turkish-speaking Muslims. The group, so newly-defined itself, had even less definition 
of their identity, of who the people were supposed to be. “What was the nature of this 
entity that was to be saved?” was the key question of the first part of the twentieth 
century (Lewis 1979:233). What little of their identity was defined was that part the 
nineteenth-century Turcologists had studied: folk culture, pre-Islamic art, vernacular 
forms of poetry. But these were more charming antiquities than rallying points for 
identity. That identity remained largely unclear until the reforms of Mustafa Kemal in the 
1920s.
It is important, even crucial, to point out that identity, once defined, can change. 
As Richard Jenkins (1996) points out, identity is more a process than an object, a 
continued renegotiation of internal and external identifying forces (who we say we are 
versus who you say we are). I treat identity here as a static object for reasons of 
simplicity, much in the same way that a complex mathematical formula may be rendered 
comprehensible by eliminating variables. Treating identity as a thing rather than a 
complicated process implies a certain dulling of the analytical knife; but makes it easier, 
in this limited format, to envision the complex relationships between identity and 
nationhood, nationalist movements, and the historical events in Turkey.
3. THE YOUNG TURKS—AND THE END9
In the early years of the twentieth century, Ottomanism remained strong, even 
among the Young Turks in exile, as it was linked on the most basic level with the 
Ottoman Empire. One could not argue for the survival of the Empire without supporting 
the principle on which it was based: the common identity of all its members as Ottoman 
subjects or citizens. The exiled Young Turks, once they came to power in the revolution 
of 1908, made Ottomanism their official policy. But, as I discuss below, events such as 
the loss of Christian provinces, and rumblings of discontent even among Muslim 
provinces, made the de facto  Turkishness of what was left of the Empire even more real 
while casting a bright light on the unlikeliness of Ottomanism ever to be effective (c.f. 
Zurcher 1993:134).
At the same time that Gokalp was writing and thinking and arguing about the 
Turkish national character, the Young Turks were living in exile, safe from the autocratic 
rule of Sultan Abdulhamid, whom they planned to replace with a more liberal and 
progressive government, ideally led by the parliament that Abdulhamid had dismissed in 
1878 (Lewis 1979:177). In this they were the intellectual heirs of the Young Ottomans, 
who had arisen as critics of the mid-nineteenth century Tanzimat reforms. Both the 
Young Ottomans and the Young Turks (the name change itself is significant) held the 
salvation of the Empire as their driving force. Both groups felt that constitutional
9 The best source on the Young Turks is Feroz Ahmad’s 1969 The Young Turks, and I draw on it heavily 
here. The fact that Ahmad (among others) has devoted an entire book to the subject underscores the very
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government as a check on the power of the Sultan and his ministers was the solution 
(Ahmad 1969:16).
During the summer of 1908, the secret Committee of Union and Progress revealed 
itself to the Sultan and the world, demanding a constitutional government. The movement 
quickly became an armed revolt, and following “the refusal of Anatolian troops to crush 
the rebellion, the [Imperial] Palace became demoralized and gave up the policy of 
repression for one of conciliation” (ibid.: 13). In July 1908, Abdulhamid gave way and 
restored the Constitution of 1876, re-establishing Parliament and a constitutional regime. 
The power of the office of the Sultan had been dealt a severe blow, from which it would 
not recover.
The Young Turks, as the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), were a diverse 
group, largely held together by their common opposition to the Sultan’s despotic regime. 
Once in power, without a common opponent, the CUP was continually plagued by 
factionalism and debate.10 For example, the stated goal of the CUP, as part and parcel of 
their drive to save the Empire, was Ottomanism. Neither Ottomanism nor the Empire 
could exist in any real sense without the other, but as time went on, pan-Turkism seemed 
to make more and more practical sense as a question of pure survival.
In early April 1909 the Society of Muhammed led a counter-revolution, opposing 
the Ottomanism and Westemist policies of the CUP and supporting the Seriat, or Islamic 
law, as the basis for rule and Islam as the basis of union. The secularism of the CUP had 
alienated traditional elements everywhere: “Islam had played a vital role in Ottoman
basic nature of the simple sketch I present here.
10 Go^ek (1996:135) notes the improvisational nature o f the Young Turks, who were most concerned, at 
first, with deposing Abdulhamid and restoring constitutional government. Ahmad (1969) also comments 
that the Young Turks “had no guiding principle for future action save an opaque notion o f constitutional
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society and continued to do so, and used as a weapon against the Committee, it provided 
the opposition with the largest audience” (ibid.:43). It was not until the army stepped in at 
the end of April to restore order that the Islamic-based movement was suppressed. 
Abdulhamid was deposed and replaced by his brother Mehmed Resad, and though the 
suppression of the counter-revolution appeared to be a victory for the CUP, the 
Committee had been weakened when it became clear they were not able to restore order 
themselves. Another result of the counter-revolution was an increased defensiveness on 
the part of the CUP, visible as the ruling party became more authoritarian. For example, 
socialist elements within the Empire had initially cheered the Young Turk revolution and 
its flag of brotherhood against the oppression of the Sultan. But after the counter­
revolution Turkish socialists found themselves facing a CUP that viewed them as threats, 
and they began to draw together against the increasingly intolerant CUP (Noutsos 
1994:84). Also significant is the fact that Islam, at least in this place and this time, had—  
as a rallying point—become a reaction against secularism rather than the unquestioned 
status quo it once had been.
In fact, pan-Islamism itself was undergoing a slow decline, but the existence of 
the few remaining non-Turkish Muslim groups in the Empire (largely Arabs) meant that 
pan-Islamism could not be abandoned altogether. In fact, in response to the threat of Arab 
revolt in 1913, the Committee relaxed its secular position, permitting Arabic to be used in 
certain schools and administrative departments, signaling a more subtle shift from the 
secular Ottomanism that had ushered in the Young Turks, to a more Islamic Ottomanism 
“prescribed by historical reality” (Ahmad 1969:136). Hanioglu (1995:200ff.) points out
government” (157-8).
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that the Young Turks, especially in the early years before they removed Abdulhamid, 
consciously promoted Islam in order to appeal to a Muslim audience, though in private 
many found fault with institutionalized Islam. The ebb and flow of Young Turk support 
of Islam is indicative of the contested nature of that institution.
The Arabs were not the only non-Turkish group within what was left of the 
Empire to threaten the principle of Ottomanism. In 1908, soon after the proclamation of a 
new constitutional government, “Austria seized the opportunity to proclaim the 
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria declared her independence; Crete 
announced her union with Greece” (Lewis 1979:214). In 1911, Italy declared war on the 
Ottoman Empire and occupied Tripoli; and in 1912, a secret alliance of Greece, Serbia, 
Montenegro, and Bulgaria invaded the Ottoman Balkan territories, “long the centre of 
gravity of the Ottoman Empire” (Lewis 1979:357). As the rapidly shrinking Empire 
became more Turkish (ethnically as well as geographically), so too did Ottomanism 
begin to give way to Turkism (Ahmad 1969:154; also see Davison 1990:25-26). This was 
not Turkish nationalism— that would come later—but pan-Turkism, which appealed to 
the expansionist feelings of the Young Turks, and which was easier to reconcile with the 
pan-Islamism necessary to appease the troubled Arab provinces (Hourani 1970:280-281; 
265-266). The dream of a single national Ottomanist identity simply could not compete 
with the more apparent and discernible identities of language, race, or ethnicity offered 
by pan-Turkism.
Even so, pan-Turkism, among the Turks living in Turkey, was more popular as a 
cultural identity than a potential political bond with their brethren in the Soviet Union, 
Persia, Afghanistan, and China. For these Anatolian Turks, although they held “a greater
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awareness of their separate identity of Turks, a new feeling of kinship with their
rediscovered ancestors and their remote cousins, a new interest in Turkish language,
folklore, and tradition [than they had prior to the pan-Turkist movement],” they were
much more cautious when it came to “closer political association” with their irredentist
cousins (Lewis 1979:351).
The Committee of Union and Progress pushed their doctrine of modernization
uncompromisingly, convinced that it was the only way to save the Empire. One of the
ideas implied by modernization was that of equal treatment before the law, and in this -we
may discern their insistence that political identity take precedence over religious
separatism. The CUP “found the idea of a Muslim and Christian, both citizens of the
same state, being governed by different laws an anachronism opposed to the most
fundamental principles of modernization” (Ahmad 1969:156). This was met with
vigorous protest from Muslim Turks, Albanians, Arabs, Slavs, and Armenians alike,
though it did lay the foundation for the Kemalist secularism and nationalism of the 1920s.
Meanwhile, Ziya Gokalp was continuing to call for a secular Turkish identity,
arguing that religion had no place in the government of a modem state. “The separation
between religion and state is a goal sought by all civilized nations,” he wrote in 1913
(Gokalp 1959:102). Such a separation, he was careful to point out, did not mean atheism
or irreligiosity, but rather the transformation of Islam from a state (political) institution
into a more privatized one of the family and the individual. He
mobilized all his energies to demolish the theocratic conception of 
nationality....[and to] demonstrate that the average Turk, who at that time 
used to identify himself as a Muslim member of the Ottoman ‘nation’, was 
confusing nation with two other sociological entities. One was iimmet, an 
international religious community, and the other was a political
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organization comprising in itself several nationalities as well as religious 
communities (Berkes 1959:24).
By 1914 the Turks were recovering from their territorial losses11 and trying to 
reconcile the Ottomanism of the Empire with the Islamism required by political realities, 
while considering the Turkist writings of Gokalp and others. Nevertheless there was an 
“atmosphere of hope and optimism,” as “the opposition parties were no more, the 
Committee had a majority in Parliament, the military was under control, and all sources 
of internal conflict and friction seem[ed] to have been removed,” thanks to increased 
control by the CUP (Ahmad 1969:150). But time had run out for the Ottoman Empire. As 
war broke out in Europe in the summer of 1914, the Turks were unwilling to remain 
neutral, feeling (probably correctly) that once conflict raged around them, they would 
have to choose their allies or face partition by Europe during the course of the war. 
Moreover, after the recent humiliating defeats in the Balkan wars, neutrality seemed 
particularly distasteful. After failing to ally with the Entente Powers (who felt that the
11 “In terms o f territory and population alone, the Turks lost about 424,000 square miles out of a total area 
of about 1,153,000 square miles, and approximately 5,000,000 souls from a population of about 24 million. 
These losses, substantial by themselves, were all the more important because Rumelia [the Balkans] was 
involved. For centuries Rumelia had been the heart o f the Empire, its provinces being by far the most 
advanced and the most productive....Rumelia had given the Empire its multi-national character and its loss
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Ottomans would be more a liability than a help), the CUP “turned to Germany and gladly 
accepted her offer of an alliance” (ibid.: 151). With the defeat of Germany four years 
later, the final nail was hammered into the Ottoman coffin.
had an immediate effect on the ideology of the Young Turks: the centre o f gravity began to shift to 
Anatolia” (Ahmad 1969:152).
4. MUSTAFA KEMAL—AND THE BEGINNING
As a young army officer, Mustafa Kemal had participated in the Young Turk 
revolution in 1908; as a general in the Ottoman Army, he built a reputation as the “most 
successful Ottoman field commander” (Davison 1990:26), especially after his victory at 
Gallipoli (Gelobolu) in 1915, and for this reason was wildly popular after the war. It is 
difficult to pinpoint, however, the point at which Kemal envisioned a national Turkish 
state as the solution to the myriad of problems facing the defeated region. He later 
pointed out that the territorial losses of the Ottoman Empire had rendered obsolete the 
policy of Ottomanism, while pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism had both failed to 
materialize into any sort of viable political identity, and that “therefore...the only 
possibility remaining was the creation of some kind of nation-state, based on the Turkish­
speaking Muslim peoples of Anatolia and eastern Thrace” (Macfie 1994:73; also see 
Kemal 1929 cited in Macfie 1994:103-104).
On 19 May, 1919, Kemal landed at Samsun, in northern Anatolia, with orders to 
oversee the demobilization of the Ninth Army. The reason for this somewhat distant 
posting, even for a general of a defeated army, lay in Istanbul, where Kemal had too- 
strongly expressed his opposition to the Allied occupation and the capitulation of the 
Sultan’s government to the victors. Upon arrival in Samsun, he took leadership of the 
nascent nationalist movement, (largely composed of small groups such as the Thrace- 
Pasaeli Defence of Rights Association) which at that point held little definition other than
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a general opposition to the Entente occupation. He hoped to organize “a national
movement capable of uniting the national forces...and securing the formation of a
government able and willing to confront the occupation forces...and negotiate a
satisfactory peace settlement” (ibid.:66). The nationalists met at Amasya, in north-central
Anatolia, where Kemal announced his “intention to convene a general assembly...in order
to scrutinise the policy pursued by the [Ottoman] government with regard to the peace
settlement” (Macfie 1994:67 citing Kemal 1929; emphasis added).
A woman named Halide Edib, a sometime confidant of Mustafa Kemal and a
prodigious writer, was well placed to describe the Amasya Protocol, as it came to be
called. Citing a book written by one of the participants, she quotes, “The central
government is entirely under foreign control. The Turkish nation is resolved to refuse
foreign domination and this is proved by the various organizations of defense all over the
country. The activities of these groups must be unified” (Edib 1928:42).
Edib also obliquely implies that replacement of the central (Ottoman) government
was acceptable to Kemal, should it become necessary:
So far, up to the signing of the Amassia protocol, there seemed no sign of 
a desire to break away from Istamboul and form a new government in 
Anatolia; moreover, the Amassia protocol was so worded that it could also 
be taken as an attempt to unify and organize the national defense against 
the opposition (ibid.).
In Sivas, in September 1919, after having been stripped of his army commission
and declared a traitor and a rebel by the occupied Ottoman government, Kemal convened
a national congress of supporters. This congress amended the manifesto they had
produced some months earlier, so that Article I read:
The various parts of the Turkish Territory which remained within our 
frontier when...the armistice concluded between the Entente Powers and
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the Turkish Government was signed, are everywhere inhabited by an 
overwhelming Moslem majority and form a whole; this cannot be 
separated [and they] would not, for any reason, detach themselves one 
from another or from the Ottoman Motherland. All the Moslem elements 
living in those countries are true believers filled with sentiments of mutual 
respect and feelings of sacrifice (quoted in Macfie 1994:74-75).
Other sections of the manifesto emphasized resistance against Greek or Armenian
expansion into the region; and, perhaps most important, a declaration that should the
Ottoman government fail to “preserve the integrity of the country,” appropriate measures
would be taken to secure the country as a whole (Macfie 1994:74-75). This was only a
few months after the Amasya Protocol, in which the Nationalist had struck a more
hesitant tone in their willingness to oppose the Ottoman government. The Nationalists
were becoming increasingly willing to take any measures necessary to “preserve the
country” against threats internal and external.
Meanwhile, emboldened by the weakened state of the region, Greek forces had
landed at Izmir (where they had been granted a zone of influence by the Entente powers)
and begun fighting their way inland. The nationalists rallied support against the Greeks,
the Turks’ old enemies, and the nationalist cause became, at least for the moment, a
territorial and ethnic fight to expel the Greeks from the ancient Turkish homeland.12
This was a key moment in the development of a Turkish identity. As they fought,
the Nationalists— by identifying the invading Greeks as enemies— were in fact
reinforcing their own status as a group, more sharply outlining themselves and the
Turkish people as a whole: if the Greeks were the Other, or not-Turks, those fighting
against them were Turks. By the same token, the Turks also bolstered their own
12 Functionally speaking, it did not hurt that the Turks were fighting for their very survival perhaps even 
before their identity as a group had been established. Although many of these struggles are part o f the 
process o f identity formation, this largely became clear afterwards. At the time, the main goal o f the Turks
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nationalist cause by linking it to an ethnic and religious struggle to repel the hated 
Greeks. The ultimate goal of the Nationalists, of course, was the expulsion of all foreign 
domination, particularly European. In 1919, however, the invading Greeks were not only 
the more immediate threat, they were also more clearly the enemy than were the 
European powers which continued to occupy Istanbul and Cilicia. Nevertheless, 
resistance to infidel domination was to become an early— if short-lived—theme of the 
nationalists. One of the earliest points Richard Jenkins (1996) makes in his excellent 
book on identity is that it is relational; that the Self needs the Other to define it.13 From 
this follows his argument, one of the themes of his work, that identity is continually 
negotiated and renegotiated between the “(internal) self-definition and the (external) 
definitions of oneself offered by others” (1996:20). We shall see below that this was the 
case in Turkey; that the internal identity of the people— what they felt they were— was 
continually in a dialectical relationship with the external identity offered by the Kemalists 
as they attempted to implement reforms designed to prescribe the Turkish identity. In 
1919, however, it was the Greeks, defined as the enemy and thus the Other, which 
enhanced the solidarity of the Nationalists.14
As Edib’s assessment of the Amassia Protocol shows, Kemal was prepared to 
break with the official Ottoman government if need be; an action which held all sorts of 
dangerous implications by virtue of the fact that it would have meant abandoning the
was survival.
13 In Evans-Pritchard’s classic ethnography (1969) on the Nuer, a Nilotic people in what is today the Sudan, 
he notes that there is “always a contradiction in the definition of a political group, for it is a group only in 
relation to other groups” (147). The relational nature o f identity is also expounded by Stuart Hall 
(1989:345) and Morley and Robins (1996:468).
14 Jenkins (1996) extensively discusses both individual and group identity. One o f the strongest themes of 
his book is that the two are different in degree, not kind; that they exist along a continuum (see especially 
1996:14-15, 39,132).
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authority of the Sultan, the old Ottoman dynasty, and even of Islam as a political force. In 
fact, this is exactly what happened: as it became increasingly clear that the Islamic 
government and the Sultan—by way of their capitulation to and cooperation with the 
Allied occupying forces— stood in the way of Turkish independence, Kemal cannily 
began shifting away from the “Muslim versus infidel” alignment which had so enflamed 
the early part of the war against the Greeks. But the Muslim-infidel battle lines were too- 
sharply etched to be forgotten in a few years, and Kemal encountered fierce resistance 
when he later tried to implement reforms derived from the very same infidels who were 
occupying the remaining Ottoman territories in 1919.
At first, however, Kemal and the Nationalists sought to work in concert with the 
Sultan and his government in Istanbul. This uneasy partnership nonetheless resulted in 
the election of a Nationalist majority to the Ottoman Parliament, which met in Istanbul in 
January 1920, despite continued resistance. It immediately adopted the Nationalist Pact, 
which explicitly defined the objectives of the Nationalist movement. The Allies, 
aggravated by this as well as by the continued military operations of the Nationalist 
forces, responded by occupying Istanbul in March and sentencing Kemal and his 
followers to death the following month.
This death sentence took the form of a fetva, or religious decree, issued by the 
Shaykh al-Islam, leader of the religious hierarchy, and it became the religious duty of any 
Muslim to kill those against whom thefetva  was issued. The very concept of a fetva , as a 
legal opinion issued by a religious leader, exemplifies the congruence of Islam and 
politics of the time (similar to the Catholic Church during the Middle Ages). The 
important implication to be drawn here is that not all Turks favored the Nationalist
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agenda at this point (early 1920); certainly the more conservative religious hierarchy 
sided with the Sultan’s occupied government in cooperating with Allied demands. In 
essence, Kemal’s followers were forced to choose between their loyalty to Islamic law 
and their loyalty to Kemal; to a certain extent, though it is doubtful that they thought of it 
this way, they were choosing between a strict interpretation of Islam, and a compelling 
nationalism.
In April 1920, the Nationalists moved to Ankara, in Central Anatolia, and 
convened a Grand National Assembly in direct challenge to the official Ottoman 
government in Istanbul, cooperation with whom had yielded the Nationalists nothing. 
Even so, the Ankara-based Grand National Assembly remained hesitant to adopt any 
anti-Istanbul decrees, though by January of the following year, Kemal had convinced the 
assembly that it should act as a representative of the Turkish people, in whom the real 
sovereignty rested. By now, the goal of Kemal and the Nationalists was clearly nothing 
other than Turkish independent nationhood, though the form of that nationhood—the 
identity of the nation— remained almost as unclear as it had since the pan-Turkists began 
suggesting it twenty years earlier.
Beginning in May 1919, the Army of the Caliphate and other anti-nationalist 
forces launched an assault on the Nationalists, who were also (meanwhile) continuing to 
fight the Greeks. This further strengthened the Nationalists’ conviction, previously little 
more than a suspicion, that they were fighting not just to expel the Greeks but for the very 
existence of what would become the Turkish nation, so instead of weakening the 
Nationalist movement, this policy only further solidified their position. It is clear that not 
all Turks supported the Nationalists in their fight for independence, though, particularly
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as the secular nature of the movement became clear. A careful examination of voting 
records even as late as 1924 shows enormous numbers of abstentions (Zilfi 1998). Many 
members of the Grand National Assembly were unwilling to oppose Kemal. But nor were 
they “necessarily opposed to the idea of Islam as a social and spiritual cement for their 
country. A lot of [Kemal’s] supporters were members of the Ulema [Islamic scholars]” 
(ibid.). Furthermore, Turkish nationalism, though it is convenient to discuss as if it were a 
unitary entity, was actually composed of “a multiplicity of resentments and 
aspirations....‘Nationalism did not displace the old loyalties. Although it grew at their 
expense, it existed side by side with them’” (Wilson 1993:345, quoting Batatu 1993).
Fragile treaties with Soviet Russia in 1921 and early 1922 (Macfie 1994:117; 
Yapp 1987:316) bolstered the Nationalist military forces, and a treaty with France in 
1921 resulting in the French withdrawal from Cilicia freed the Nationalist forces to 
concentrate on other regions. Slowly at first and then with increasing speed, they drove 
the Greeks back towards Izmir and the sea. As the Nationalists made headway against the 
retreating Greek forces, the Entente powers had repeatedly pressed for a diplomatic 
solution. Kemal, though careful not to discourage these suggestions, remained obstinate: 
“On no account, it was made clear, would any settlement be accepted which did not 
secure the complete independence, political, juridical, economic and financial, of the 
Turkish state” (Kemal 1929 cited in Macfie 1994:124).
Meanwhile, as the Greeks suffered defeat after defeat during the summer and fall 
of 1922, the way was left open for a Nationalist occupation of Istanbul. Four years after 
the end of World War I, the Britain was unable to convince her other Allies to help 
defend the capital against the advancing Nationalists, who demanded a renegotiation of
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the harsh terms of the Sevres settlement. Having no other option, in late 1922 Britain and 
the Allies invited both the Nationalists and the official Ottoman government to talks in 
Lausanne, Switzerland. The Grand National Assembly recognized the potential weakness 
of having two Turkish delegations at the talks, and voted to abolish the sultanate— and 
with it the last of the Ottoman government— on 1 November 1922. In Kemal’s words, 
“the curtain fell on the last act of the overthrow and breakdown of the Ottoman 
Monarchy” (Kemal 1924, quoted in Macfie 1994:127).
The Lausanne conference concluded in July 1923, and resulted in the only 
renegotiated peace settlement of all the defeated Axis powers. The Lausanne Treaty 
recognized and settled Turkish claims to territory along the present-day boundaries in 
Anatolia and Thrace. On 29 October 1923, the Grand National Assembly amended the 
Constitution to declare Turkey a republic and Mustafa Kemal its first president.
Ottomanism had died with the Ottoman Empire; pan-Islamism, despite a strong 
and widespread Islamic identity, had failed to materialize into a viable political entity; 
and Turkish nationalism, distilled from pan-Turkism and driven by a territorial notion of 
ethnolinguistic homeland, reigned supreme.
5. THE KEMALIST REFORMS
Although the legal and political creation of the Republic of Turkey was an 
important turning point, it was in fact only one in a series of difficult successes for Kemal 
and the Nationalists. It is important to understand the birth of the Turkish state not as the 
Beginning of Turkey, but rather one of many social, political, legal, and administrative 
changes that were all linked to Kemal’s plan to modernize Turkey, and all of which 
formed the necessary foundation of the Turkish Republic. The only way for the new 
country to survive, Kemal and others believed, was to bring it into the twentieth century; 
and the only way to do so was through a dramatic and possibly painful replacement of 
Eastern civilization with that of the West, as first outlined by Ziya Gokalp. The ties 
binding Turkey to backwardness, to disunity, and even to the institutionalized political 
Islam that had marked every Islamic state since Muhammed, were to be severed so that 
Turkey could become a modem nation on the European model.
In 1923, Gokalp wrote:
There is only one road to salvation: To advance in order to reach—that is, 
in order to be equal to—Europeans in the sciences and industry as well as 
in military and judicial institutions. And there is only one means to 
achieve this: to adapt ourselves to Western civilization completely!
For example, as of November 1922, the caliph remained as the religious ruler of
the state. Before 1922, the sultan had also held the office of the Caliphate, but Kemal
abolished the sultanate in November of that year, he retained the institution of the
Caliphate by separating it from the sultanate and assigning it the sultan’s cousin, Abdul
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Megid. And although Kemal believed that the future of Turkey lay in secularism, he felt 
that time and circumstances were not yet right for the abolition of the Caliphate. He 
“realized that if the Sultanate had become an anachronism for Turkey, the Caliphate was 
even more so for the world of Islam. ‘Following the abolition of the Sultanate,’ he says,
‘I accepted the abolition of the Caliphate, as it was nothing but the same personal 
sovereignty under another name’” (Berkes 1964:457 quoting Kemal 1927:426). When 
Turkish independence was proclaimed on 29 October 1923, Kemal felt that it was 
premature to insist on a secular state, though he remained extremely uncomfortable in his 
role as president of an Islamic state (Berkes 1964:457). The secular intentions of the 
Kemalists were clear, though they were not aired openly at first, and long and heated 
debates took place between them and the Khilafatists, who supported the Caliphate as 
Turkey’s link to the past and the Islamic world (ibid.). Kemal agreed, and it “was 
precisely for that reason that he was determined to break it” (Lewis 1979:263). By early 
1924, Kemal railed openly against the Khilafatists whom, he argued, claimed that “the 
Caliphate is State and the Caliph the head of the state and, hence, in reality, the Caliph 
should be the head of the Turkish state” (quoted in Berkes 1954.:459).
Niyazi Berkes (ibid.:460) comments that “[f]ew expected that Mustafa 
Kemal...would succeed in arousing national feelings to a higher level than that of zeal,” 
but it is hard to say whether the successful abolition of the Caliphate was caused by 
excessive secular-national sentiment or religious apathy. What matters is that both of 
these, apparently, occurred at the same time: on 3 March 1924, the Assembly passed a 
bill legally abolishing the Caliphate— and setting the tone for many of the reforms to 
follow. The modernizing ideal of secularism had taken form, in this case, as the abolition
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of the Caliphate, but it was to continue to “produce a series of secularizing reforms within
legal, educational, and cultural institutions” (ibid.:461).
Secularization was, in the minds of the Kemalists, only the first step towards a
viable nation. It was linked to Westernization, which was seen as equally important.
Kemal’s project of replacing the cumbersome and outdated Ottoman or Oriental
civilization with that of the West implied the importation of the technological, scientific,
and industrial products of the successful West. In 1922, even before Turkey had become
a republic, Kemal was calling for change:
Ideas full of irrational superstition are morbid. Social life dominated by 
irrational, useless, and harmful beliefs is doomed to paralysis....Our guide 
in political, social, and educational life will be [Western] 
science....Progress is too difficult or even impossible for nations that insist 
on preserving their traditions and beliefs lacking in rational bases (quoted 
in Berkes 1964:465-466).
And two years later, in a speech given in late 1924, Kemal asserted:
Changing the rules of life in accordance with the times is an absolute 
necessity. In an age when inventions and the wonders of science are 
bringing change after change in the conditions of life, nations cannot 
maintain their existence by age-old rotten mentalities and by tradition- 
worshipping....Superstitions and nonsense have to be thrown out of our 
heads (quoted in ibid.:464).
The most important, and most controversial import of all was secularism. In fact, 
secularism was often seen as the element that had contributed most to the success of the 
West; by extension, religion was thought to have held back the East and Turkey in 
particular. Not religion as a general concept, but its saturation of all aspects of Eastern 
life (Berkes 1964:464, paraphrasing Agaoglu 1928).
With the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924, the Seri at, or Islamic civil law, was 
no longer the law of the state, though it was not abolished outright. But formulating a
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new civil code required more than simply importing one from a European country. The
problem was voiced by the Minister of Justice in 1924: “It is not an easy task to frame
laws suiting the mores of a people. We are now faced with the question of determining
which legal provisions are suitable and agreeable to the social conditions of our country”
(quoted in Berkes 1964:468). After two years of debate, the National Assembly passed
the new Civil Code, a rough adaptation of the Swiss Civil Code (itself modeled after
Germanic legal principles) on 17 February 1926. The preamble to the new Civil Code
contained a remarkable outline of the ideas of the Kemalist reformers:
There is no fundamental difference in the needs of nations belonging to 
the modem family of civilization....We must never forget that the Turkish 
nation has decided to accept modem civilization and its living principles 
without any condition or reservation....If there are some points of 
contemporary civilization that do not seem capable of conforming to 
Turkish society, this is...because of the medieval organization and the 
religious codes which abnormally surround it....The Turkish nation, which 
is moving with determination to seize contemporary civilization and make 
it its own, is obliged not to make contemporary civilization conform to the 
Turkish nation, but to adjust its steps to the requirements of contemporary 
civilization at all costs (quoted in Berkes 1964:471).
It is worth noting the degree of change suggested by the Kemalists: every element 
of the Turkish nation that did not conform to “contemporary civilization” (Western 
civilization, the reformers felt) was to be changed so that it did. Very little of the “old” 
(Ottoman) Turkey was seen as acceptable—though future generations would question 
this full-scale reliance on the West as model to be followed. It was perhaps the extreme 
nature of the situation that led to what appears to be such a drastic solution: the 
reformers, after all, were not suggesting these changes arbitrarily but rather were fighting
to save the new nation.
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The Civil Code embodied the overall prescriptive nature of the Kemalist reforms: 
“the aim of the makers of the Code was not to establish and regulate the civil relations of 
the people according to existing customs and mores, or religious provisions. On the 
contrary, it was to shape these relations according to what the makers o f the Code 
believed they should be” (ibid.; emphasis added). By serving as the replacement for the 
traditional Seriat, the Code “signified the unmitigated secularization of civil life” by such 
things as changing the nature of divorce and marriage, prohibiting polygamy, requiring 
family names (this was adopted in 1934), and, perhaps most importantly, radically 
improving the situation of women, who were enfranchised in 1931 and given “full 
political rights and duties in 1934” (ibid.:472-473).
The process of secularization implied more than legal and civil changes. The so- 
called “Hat Law” of 1925 prohibited the wearing of the fez, which Kemal decried as a 
backward symbol of ignorance and superstition.15 He stopped short of outlawing the 
traditional veil of Islamic women, but strongly discouraged its use. With the fiercely- 
debated adoption of the Latin script in 1928 came implications of abandoning the sacred 
Arabic script and— even more offensive to Muslims— translating the Koran into 
vernacular Turkish. It was soon prohibited to teach the Arabic script in schools other than 
institutions of higher learning. Kemal focused on education as the best means teaching 
the new values of the nation to its youngest members. As early as 1921, he addressed a 
group of teachers: “When I speak of national education I mean an education that will be 
free from all traditional superstitions as well as from all foreign influences, Eastern or 
Western, that are incompatible with our national character” (quoted in Berkes 1964:477).
15 See Lewis 1979:267 for an excellent discussion of the implications o f Kemal’s outlawing what was, for
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Although the final blow to the concept of an Islamic polity came when the article
declaring Islam a state institution was dropped from the Constitution in 1928, this
“neither reflected nor produced a clear and positive doctrine of secularism,” which was
not made a formal part of the Constitution until nine years later (see below). Despite the
lack of an official policy of secularism, however, after 1928 Kemal focused on other
issues, believing that
the course of development of the religious consciousness of the people 
could not and should not be led by the state or by secular personalities.
The religious question, then, became a matter of free discussion within 
the...frame work of a secularized state. Its discussion shifted from the 
theological to the philosophical level (ibid.:496).
Such a shift to a higher level of abstraction signified, at least in the minds of those 
debating such issues, a major conceptual shift. The role of religion had become less of an 
immediate issue for many, though it remained, as it does today, a potent force throughout 
Turkey; particularly in the rural areas, where notions of State and Patriotism, as I discuss 
below, seem irrelevant.
But Kemalist secularism was not the abolition of Islam, as Gokalp made clear 
(1959:102; also see Berkes in ibid.:24), but rather, the rejection of the concept of an 
Islamic state (Berkes 1964:499). Religion remained an important, even crucial element in 
the lives of the Turkish people. But it should be equated, the Kemalists believed, neither 
with the Turkish state nor with Turkish culture. Islam had its own personal and privatized 
sphere of influence, one which had been established for it, and then— through legally- 
enforced guarantees of thought and expression— protected.16
many, “the last symbol o f Muslim identification.”
16 “Religion was guaranteed freedom and protection as long and insofar as it was not utilized to promote 
any social or political ideology having institutional implications” (Berkes 1964:499).
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In 1937, the “Six Arrows of Kemalism” were added to the Constitution. These 
principles were not rigid ideologies, nor were they an outline of changes decided upon by 
Kemal before they were implemented. More than anything, they were summaries of the 
intentions of the Kemalist reforms, adopted after the fact as descriptive statements. As 
they were amended to the Constitution, the six principles were Republicanism, 
Nationalism, Populism, Statism, Secularism, and Revolutionary-Reformism (Ahmad
171993:63). Together they stood for the majority of the reforms implemented by the 
Kemalists in the 1920s and early 1930s; reforms that were designed primarily to make 
Turkey a viable nation by overhauling and rebuilding the peoples’ identity as Turkish, 
rather than Ottoman, citizens.
It is important to remember that not all of these new ideas originated with Kemal; 
if he had not been able to build on the work of those who came before, he would have 
had even a harder time implementing the reforms. For example, Gokalp suggested 
secularism as a crucial component of any modem nation, decades before Kemal made it 
law. Many ideas behind the Tanzimat reforms— such as discrete territorialism, populism, 
civil rather than religious identity—were to reappear as Kemalist reforms (Davison 
1990:244ff.). If nothing else, there was an intellectual tradition of reform, though perhaps 
only a faint one, by the time Turkey became a republic in 1923.
17 These principles were by no means agreed-upon, nor was there any overall consensus as to what 
precisely some o f them meant in the first place. For instance, statism, “which accepted the necessity of the 
constructive intervention of the state in the national economy,” (Armajani and Ricks 1986:244), relied on a 
fairly subjective judgment of how much intervention was necessary and appropriate. Revolutionary- 
Reformism was also interpreted differently: moderates saw the state itself as reformist in nature, whereas 
radicals envisioned periodic necessary revolutions (Ahmad 1993:63-64; also see Yapp 1991:161-162).
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What Kemal had done was to link values to the new identity.18 The citizens of the
new nation, he was convinced, were to be identified and differentiated from those of the
old Ottoman Empire by their values: modernity, secularism, positivism, technology,
industry. Since the beginnings of Turcology and pan-Turkism in the nineteenth century,
and certainly as of the war with the Greeks after World War I, the Turkish people had
become increasingly accustomed to thinking of themselves as a group. Yet this group,
remained, to a large extent, undefined— without a discrete identity—until the Kemalist
reforms provided a suite of values for the Turks to call their own. Serif Mardin (1993)
emphasizes Kemal’s role in providing the crucial second half of the equation of “group”
and “identity of that group”:19
What happened was that Mustafa Kemal took up a non-existent, 
hypothetical entity, the Turkish nation, and breathed life into it. It is the 
ability to work for something which did not exist as if  it existed, and to 
make it exist, which gives us the true dimensions of the project on which 
he had set out and which brings out the utopian quality of his thinking.
Neither the Turkish nation as the fountainhead of a ‘general will* nor the 
Turkish nation as a source of national identity existed at the time he set out 
on this task (366).
Two caveats need to be made right away. First, obviously, the group had some 
degree of identity, such as folk culture, vernacular language, a sense of a common
18 Richard Jenkins (1996) has much to say on the issue o f (internally-based) identification versus 
(externally-based) categorization; or in other words, what a group feels its identity to be versus how an 
outsider, usually in a position of power, categorizes that group. This raises thorny emic and etic issues (are 
they who they say they are or who we say they are?) which I will not delve into here. Suffice it to say that 
in Turkey’s case, the internal identification was that o f the people, and mostly included such values as 
religion, tradition, and local loyalties. Kemal’s categorization of the people as citizens o f the new and 
modern nation was directly opposed to most o f these values. As I point out below, the tension between 
what the Turkish people feel they are, and what the modernizing elements tell them to be, continues to this 
day.
19 Consider the Preamble to the United States Constitution, in which the first three words explicitly serve to 
differentiate the group in question, and the rest o f the text sets out the values o f that group: “We the people 
of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, 
provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings o f liberty to 
ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution o f the United States o f America.”
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history, prior to the reforms. But this was not sufficient to distinguish them as a separate 
group: they needed more definition of who they were if they were to become a viable, 
independent nation. Second, even more obviously, it was not as simple as the Kemalists 
supplying and the people accepting a group of values, like a winning hand in poker, as a 
viable identity to be shared throughout the group. As I discuss below, Kemal’s reforms 
were resisted vigorously and sometimes successfully. And the Kemalists enforced the 
reforms with equal vigor, crushing a Kurdish pro-Islamic rebellion in 1925 and executing 
forty-six of the rebel leaders. It is more accurate to state that the Kemalists provided  an 
identity for the Turkish people; something with which the people could say: this is who 
we are. Whether or not that identity was accepted, and the degree to which it was 
accepted or rejected, is a question still burning in Turkey today.
The Turkish people perceived the reforms (rightly so) as comprising a threat to 
their identity. Kemal’s program of top-down modernity implied, for many, the imposition 
of moral and social practices strikingly different from those they had learned as children. 
And it was those old practices, Kemal felt, that were holding the country back from its 
rightful place as a scion of the twentieth century.
6. RURAL REACTION TO THE KEMALIST REFORMS
Kemal’s Village Law, passed in 1924, was one of his earliest attempts to legislate 
modernity. “He had conceived of this law as being one of a series of decrees to 
modernize Turkish society” (Szyliowicz 1966:49). The law prescribed sixty-eight 
compulsory and optional changes which, when implemented, were to make the villages 
cleaner, healthier, less backward, more modem. The law included such items as: the 
elimination of standing pools of water (compulsory), a covered toilet for every house 
(also compulsory), and care for the poor and their families (optional) (ibid.:36-37). As 
part of a study in political modernization, Szyliowicz examined the village of Erdemli, on 
the southern Anatolian coast, in 1941 and again in 1957. He found that the Village Law, 
despite its specificity, “had almost no influence on rural life, its impact being limited to 
administrative and legal matters” (ibid.:37). This was not due solely to lack of enthusiasm 
for modernity on the villagers’ part, though Szyliowicz felt that that did play a role 
(ibid.: 198). But in addition to this resistance, Szyliowicz points out that after the passing 
of the Village Law, “no effort was made to collect the taxes or carry out the projects 
listed therein unless outside pressure was applied and this was seldom forthcoming, for 
the administration was satisfied with token compliance with the law” (ibid.:38). He 
concludes that the isolation of many villages— other than Istanbul and a few other large 
cities, Turkey was outstandingly rural at that time and to some extent, remains so today—  
combined with halfhearted or nonexistent enforcement of the decrees in the face of a
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conservative “peasantry,” was responsible for the diluted success of the reforms, 
particularly in non-urban areas.
Sixteen years later, in 1957, Szyliowicz found Erdemli to be somewhat less 
isolated than it had been, but nevertheless still the focus of identity for many of its 
citizens: “Although most villagers felt a distinct sense of national pride and loyalty [more 
so than in 1941], they did not yet identify their own future with developments in [the 
capital at] Ankara....[R]ural public opinion was concerned mainly with local events and 
conditions” (ibid.: 185). The anthropologist Paul Stirling found a very similar emphasis 
on local identities and issues during his fieldwork in rural areas, as discussed below.
But it would be a mistake to characterize the villagers as permanently frozen in a 
sort of suspended state of local-centric identity. Syzliowicz found that infrastructural 
changes such as agricultural assistance and the construction of roads, financed by the 
national government, strengthened the villagers’ ties with Ankara and the nation as a 
whole. For example, after World War n, the national road-building program (aided by 
funds through the Marshall Plan), “gave the country an economic unity it had previously 
never possessed. No longer were the villagers semi-isolated from the world around them; 
they were suddenly thrust into contact with the rest of the country” (ibid.: 143). Therefore, 
he concludes (in 1957), as the isolation of the hinterland continues to decrease, the effect 
of Kemal’s reforms will only increase and spread (ibid.: 198). Szyliowicz fails to 
recognize, however, that national roads do not necessarily imply national identity: the 
flow of vehicles, though it can do so, does not have to carry with it the flow ideas and 
values.
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Paul Stirling lived in two Turkish villages in 1949-1950 and in 1951. He describes
a strong sense of village solidarity, a solidarity which was set in opposition to that of
neighboring villages as well as to the larger nation. The creation of the new nation in
1923 disrupted the longstanding village-scale affiliations, “demanding a new loyalty”
(Stirling 1965:268). Not only that, but the nation (Stirling found), with its accompanying
new legal, political, and economic systems, is in constant tension with the village.
Stirling depicts not a village transformed into modernity by the Kemalist reforms, but
rather one uncomfortably straddling the widening gulf between tradition and modernity,
with all the troubling contradictions and compromises implied by such a tension. Such a
characterization may be equally applied to Turkey today.
For example, in his study of the two villages he lived in, Stirling found that the
nation of Turkey remains a poor second to the village in terms of loyalty. The villages are
almost independent entities, and inter-village conflicts serve only to underscore this
independence as well as to strengthen village loyalty.
People belong to their village in a way they belong to no other social 
group....
None of the geographical or administrative units larger than a 
village is in any way comparable....[and] the actual units of administration 
[such as provinces or districts]...have no social relevance outside their 
administrative functions....
The virtues of the village are an eternal topic of conversation with 
outsiders....Other villages are savage, mean, dishonourable, lying, lazy, 
cowardly....
....If any other village attempts to use land lying within the village 
boundaries, people mobilise rapidly and are quite prepared to fight, with 
fire-arms if necessary....Not even lineages cross village frontiers, so that 
the village from the outside presents a solid front of loyalty (ibid.:29-30).
Such a strong, almost fiercely defensive identification with, and loyalty to, one’s
own village and land is at the cost of a larger national affiliation. Of two demanding
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masters, the closer one, the more relevant one, the more real one, was the village. But
most people do not consciously carry a hierarchy of loyalties in the forefront of their
minds, of course. The reality is more frequently a tangle of reasons and memories, some
learned, some experienced first-hand, and most of them clothed in terms other than
“group affiliation.” For example, Stirling (ibid.:70) found that young men were expected
to stay in the village and work; and that those who give in to the appeal of the big city
and quick cash are less respected than those who stay home, raise a family, and work the
land— in short, those who uphold the traditional values of the village:
The trappings of sophistication— suits, watches, and fountain pens— have 
some appeal, but a scruffy old man who has land and works it well carries 
much more weight in the village than an elegant young usta [skilled 
worker]. Young men enjoy the liberties of the city and the feel of cash in 
their pockets, but the older men almost unanimously declare that they 
would far rather stay at home with their families and farm their land.
The State is seen most often as a burdensome structure that insists on changing
things that should not be changed and generally interfering with village issues. The role
of village headman, for example, which at one time had been available only to the oldest,
wisest, and most experienced man, was now (1950) filled by much younger men for
briefer periods of office. The position of headman “was no longer the top of the village
but the bottom of the official State hierarchy” and thus much less desirable (ibid.:254).
The national government, as “maintainer of law and order, legitimate robber (for tax
purposes),...arbitrary universal provider,...[and] vote-catcher,” was envisioned by the
villagers as a fickle and powerful institution which alternately hindered and aided them
(ibid.:269).
For example, the villagers considered it shameful for a dispute to be taken to the 
courts, preferring to settle things locally and traditionally, and “although legal rights
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seldom correspond to customary village rights” (ibid.:273), the people rarely complain 
about this discrepancy. They use the courts when there is no other option, and accept 
their judgment, albeit grudgingly. The villagers are clearly unhappy over the discrepancy 
between their systems and those of the state; yet at the same time they accept the “new” 
rules (twenty-five years old by the time Stirling was there). The villages are dependent on 
the towns economically (ibid.:266); the national economy provides crucial aid to the 
villages in times of drought or famine; compulsory national military service encourages 
identification with the nation. All of this tends to foster “strong links and a growing 
intimacy with the impersonal large-scale society of the nation and the cities” (ibid.:81). 
Nevertheless, caught in an uncomfortable tension, the villagers see their future “in terms 
of the village and not of the nation” (ibid.:82), and disdain Western manners, dress, and 
lifestyles as European and infidel. “I pointed to two educated Turkish women in Western 
dress and cosmetics who were passing. ‘They are not Turks,’ [said a village woman], 
‘they are foreigners’” (ibid.:289).20
Mahmut Makal, bom in 1931 and thus “a son of the Ataturk period of reforms” 
(Thomas 1954:ix), was raised in a small village in central Anatolia. He attended one of 
the new Village Institutes, and in 1947, at the age of sixteen, became the “sole village 
teacher at the school of Niirguz” (ibid.:x). A strong believer in modernity and the values 
preached by the Kemalists, Makal’s reaction to the villagers is telling. He describes their 
world as one centered on tradition, hard work, conservative manners, and local (village- 
scale) ties and affiliations. A higher education was not part of this matrix: “‘Now that 
you’ve studied,’ they told me, ‘you must go and be Governor of a Province or a District.
20 One hopes that, particularly as an anthropologist, Stirling had some reason to believe the women were 
educated other than the Way they looked.
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What future is there for you if you stay with us and waste your time in the village?’”
(Makal 1954:31). Istanbul, the big cities, the reforms, were all seen as different, far away,
and less down-to-earth than traditional village life. When Makal complains about all the
straw dust everywhere, his father retorts, ‘“Anyone would think his lordship had been
brought up in Istanbul’” (ibid.:34).
The villagers Makal lived among had, without a doubt, reaped some of the
rewards of the Kemalist reforms (such as government loans, agricultural assistance, and
schools), but vigorously fought others, such as the imposition of the Latin script (decreed
in 1928, almost a generation before Makal arrived).21 Makal found that religion was the
identity most threatened by the Kemalist reforms, and the one to which the villagers
remained most loyal:
Unless the written or spoken word has some connection with a religious 
question, it is of no importance to the villagers. Although they will listen 
to other matters if they are read out, and say that they are good, or bad, or 
interesting, they will always add this comment: ‘At bottom, those things 
don’t really concern us. The age we live in demands them and we listen, 
of course, but it is the other thing [religion] that really matters (ibid.: 104).
Foreigner was equated with infidel, and as an outsider attempting to teach the
villagers new and foreign values, Makal was accused of being “in the service of
foreigners” (ibid.: 105). Recall that the Nationalist movement had begun as one invoking
Muslim resistance to the domination of infidel foreigners. The fact that the Nationalists
were able to use this, if briefly, as such a successful rallying cry underscores how
21 In fact, Makal’s first experience in Nurgiiz involved a confrontation with the hatib, or local religious 
leader, who refused Makal the use o f the mosque to teach students while the new school building was being 
completed: ‘“I’m not going to open the Mosque for you to run a school on infidel lines’ [he told Makal]” 
(ibid.: 1). Paul Stirling, who edited the book, points out that what made Makal’s teaching heretical was the 
fact that he used and taught the Latin script, rather than the sacred Arabic (ibid.). At the second village 
Makal taught at, he experienced the same problem, voiced even more explicitly by the hoja, or religious 
teacher (similar to a hatib)'. ‘“It’s a sin, you know— hanging up those charts with the children’s alphabet on 
them and reciting from them is forbidden by the sacred word’” (ibid.: 144).
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pervasive and longstanding an idea it was— and continued to be in Makal’s time, despite 
Kemal’s attempts to reverse the equation and bring in Western values.
Despite what seemed to be serious rifts between national-scale identity and a 
village identity demanded by the sometimes harsh realities of day-to-day living 
(particularly in a region as climatically severe as that of central Anatolia), Stirling points 
to a growing connection (in the 1950s) between the rural and urban landscapes, between 
the values of the village and the economics of the city, between the structures of the state 
and the customs of the villagers. The consequence of this is an increasing sense of 
inferiority within the villages, at the expense of their own “pride and independent spirit” 
(ibid.:292; also see 284). The difficulty is not that the villagers are forced to choose 
between city life and village life, but rather between the values associated with the state, 
with Kemal’s reforms, and with city life on the one hand; and their own traditional values 
on the other. And this was how the Turkish people experienced Kemal’s modernization.
Kemal’s structural, economic, and administrative changes, his moving the capital 
00from Istanbul to Ankara, his establishment of a limited democratic system, the Turkish 
Constitution...all of these are not modernity in themselves, but rather the trappings of that 
elusive concept. Modernity, at least as it was experienced by the Turkish people during 
the 1920s and afterward, meant a revolution in values, manifest in ways as diverse as the 
abolishment of the fez, the teaching of Turkish in the Latin script, the encouragement of 
women to go veilless, and of men to dress as Westerners. It is hard to say which is more
22 This was one o f the first acts o f the Grand National Assembly, in October 1923. Istanbul was tied to 
memories of the Ottomans, o f Imperial Islam, o f five centuries of decline, o f palace intrigues and corrupt 
bureaucracies and everything the Nationalists wished to leave behind.
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noteworthy: Kemal’s audacity in proposing such reforms, or his ability to carry them out 
in the face of such opposition.
7. HISTORY AND IDENTITY
The values behind Kemal’s reforms, though fundamental to the new identity he
was prescribing, were not that identity’s only components. History also plays an
important role; especially in Turkey, where the relationship between the people and their
past is particularly strong. Debates rage on as to whether history is a sort of corporate
memory of the past, or a more utilitarian construction that may or may not be what
“really” happened. Perhaps the best middle ground is to state that history can be
constructed, sometimes with a particular goal in mind:
[Historical writings [can be] written for the express purpose of recording 
the events of the past for the information and guidance of the present and 
of the future....Those who are in power control to a very large extent the 
presentation of the past, and seek to make sure that it is presented in such a 
way as to buttress and legitimize their own authority, and to affirm the 
rights and merits of the group which they lead (Lewis 1975:53).
Three general bodies of Turkish historiography existed during the first part of the
twentieth century, roughly mirroring Ottomanism, pan-Turkism, and folk- or “local”
Turkism. Like many fields of scholarship, these were not discrete bodies of thought, nor
did the thinkers of the time necessarily divide their work into these three categories.
Nevertheless, three versions of Turkey’s past competed for attention,24 each with a
somewhat different emphasis (ibid.:38-39): the remembered and relatively recent history
23 Richard Jenkins, for example, claims that “[individually ‘the past’ is memory, collectively it is history. 
Neither, however, are ‘real’: both are fundamentally constructs and both are important facets o f identity” 
(1996:28).
24 Chatterjee points out that “a primary sign o f the nationalist consciousness [in general is] that it will not 
find its own voice in histories written by foreign rulers and that it will set out to write for itself the account 
of its own past” (1993:77).
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of the Ottoman Empire; Turcologist-inspired history, written in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, of early Turks in Central Asia; and finally, most recently- 
learned, the history of pre-Turkish Anatolia (focusing on the Hittites and the roots of 
Turkish “folk-culture.” See Ziya Gokalp, above).25 The Ottoman history was marked by 
decay and failure, and in fact represented all that which Kemal hoped to leave behind by 
way of his reforms. Turcologist histories focusing on the expansive population of Turks 
across Central Asia was also unacceptable, as the vague pan-Turkist identity it implied 
had lacked the territorial component that made Turkish Nationalism stand out and 
eventually break free. That left the pre-Turkish Anatolian past, a history which not only 
avoided the problems of the other two, but which would actually, Kemal hoped, increase 
the identification of the Turks with their homeland.26 This was a kind of tradition- 
making, of establishing a link to a past people who, though they were not ethnic Turks, 
had inhabited the same region, endured the same climate, and contributed to the culture 
of the modem Turkish people. To this end, Kemal wrote and encouraged a new and 
glorious history for his people, drawing on the earliest histories of Anatolia, and in which 
Turkish was the root of European languages and the Turks were the founders and heralds 
of Middle East civilization.27
James Orr’s discussion (1991) of an annual celebration in Sakin Tepe, a small 
Thracian town shows the important role that history can play in identity. Although neither
25 Lewis later makes the compelling argument that historians control— or at least affect— not only the 
words they put on the page, but the very entities those words describe, as histories can focus on, and reify, 
subjects which previously may only have existed on a map, or in the minds o f a few leaders.
26 A clause in Kemal’s 1935 Republican People’s Party Program read: ‘T he fatherland is the sacred country 
within our present political boundaries, where the Turkish nation lives with its ancient and illustrious 
history, and with its past glories still living in the depths o f the soil” (quoted in Lewis 1979:39).
27 The “Sun Language Theory” was only considered briefly, but is important in that it demonstrates 
Kemal’s willingness to appropriate history as part of his plan o f prescribed identity. See Lewis (1979: 435).
60
an official national holiday nor a religious or local celebration the event was termed 
kurtulus giinii, a “Turkish compound noun associating gun— day— with kurtulus—  
independence, salvation, and liberation” (On* 1991:143). The celebration took the form of 
a patriotic performance, in which actors portraying Turkish citizens were first seized and 
imprisoned by Greek soldiers, but were then freed by Turkish soldiers, who captured the 
Greek fortress and raised over it the Turkish flag (ibid.: 144). This drama was enacted 
annually. Its characters and indeed the setting were not specific: the events portrayed 
could have happened in a variety of places and times. This very lack of specifics, Orr 
notes, implies a synecdoche, where “Salvation and freedom” (the Turkish military) 
triumphs over “Occupation and oppression” (the Greek military). This ritualized 
performance of the town’s kurtulus giinii constructed and maintained contemporary 
national identity through the mobilization of a certain, specific historical consciousness, 
as well as by invoking the more personal (though correspondingly more vague) memories 
of war with the Greeks, almost sixty years earlier.
Michel-Rolph Trouillot points out that such dramatic commemorations serve to 
“mythicize history” (1995:118) and encourage certain aspects of the identity of both the 
participants and the audience. Celebrations such as this one serve to codify history into a 
simpler, more easily-leamable sequence of events, rich with morality and frequently 
presented dramatically— that is, as a dramaturgical performance as well as one filled with 
emotion and intensity. The simplified, moralized history carries great significance for the 
actors and audience, for it is directly relevant to them: they are performing for 
themselves.28 Not only that, but such ritualized affirmations of identity can carry with
28 Describing a Martiniquan play about the life o f a local figure, Richard Price (1998:208) points out that “it
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them equivalent affirmations of the organizational structure implicit in such “we-ness,” in 
this case, the Turkish state (Jenkins 1996:144-146). In fact, Jenkins speculates, such 
ritualized identification may actually be a necessary part of identity; at least of the 
internal-based, self-identification half of the dialectic: “identity— as a definitively social 
construct— can never be essential or primordial, so it has to be made to seem  so”
(ibid.: 146). Thus the Turks always triumph over the Greeks at Sakin Tepe.
In sum, history, whether it is constructed, uncovered, or remembered (Lewis 
1979) can inform identity— and vice versa29 And those who would modify that identity30 
frequently call upon history as a means to do so. Kemal was careful to nurture the 
Turkish people’s relationship with the past—but, significantly, the past of his choosing.
was— when performed— meaningful history, a version o f a people’s own past that they could recognize and 
identify with.” Also see van der Veer (1990:84).
29 Bernard Lewis (1975:41) also examines the role played by a Persian celebration in forming a national 
identity for that state.
30 Or even those who would mobilize that identity often call upon history. Ronald Reagan’s 1980 
presidential campaign slogan was, for example, “It’s morning in America again,” hearkening back to an 
idealized sunny vision o f America, shorn o f the ugliness of history. Adolf Hitler emphasized the German’s 
bellicose Teutonic heritage as an alternative to the passive and ineffectual Christianity that had been foisted 
on them by non-Aryans.
8. TURKEY TODAY
Turkey’s relationship with its past, as with most nations, continues to this day; 
this past continues to play a powerful role in contemporary Turkish identity— an identity 
which is in continuous formation and renegotiation. Mary Voigt, an archaeologist who 
has been working at an Iron Age site in southeastern Turkey, points out that some 
people— mostly younger students— are incensed to find foreigners studying Turkey’s 
past, a past which they feel should belong only to the Turks (Voigt 1998). Moreover, 
despite the occasional Islamic fundamentalists (who grant the existence of a pre-Islamic 
Anatolian past but describe it as trivial and a waste of money to study), she finds that in 
the rural area in which she works, the study of the past is encouraged more often than not. 
For example, politicians emphasize the national heritage of such sites, which are often 
visited by local school groups.
Madeleine Zilfi, a historian of the Ottoman Empire, notes that she has never 
encountered explicit encouragement or discouragement of a particular line of research in 
the Turkish archives. Like many if not all modem nations, Turkey has its share of 
sensitive documents and information which are restricted for a period of time, often fifty 
or one hundred years. Overall, however, she finds Turkey to be fairly open about at least 
its Ottoman past (Zilfi 1998)
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The Turkish struggle for an appropriate identity is apparent on a larger scale as
0 1
well. Describing the debates over Turkey’s application to the European Union, Philip
Robins (1991:3) points out that “[t]here appears to be some considerable doubt even
among Turks of similar socio-economic background as to the exact nature of the country
and its people, and how this should manifest itself in the external relations of the state.”
Caught uncomfortably between East and West, Turkey is in the unenviable middle
position of a dichotomous world, and despite claims to serve as the bridge spanning the
gap between the two, seems to be in danger of falling into that gap:
[R]ather than understanding both continents and both cultures, and hence 
having a unique role as interpreter to both, Turkey comprehends neither 
adequately to fulfill this role. Its relationship with the Arabs, the Persians 
and the majority of Islamic states is confused and tentative. Its 
relationship with the West is increasingly marked by suspicion and 
resentment. Moreover, divisions within Turkey, between Western- 
educated, urban businessmen and intellectuals, and the rural, personally 
pious peasants, mirror the divisions between the two continents that it 
straddles (Philip Robins 1991:14; also see 114-115).
As pointed out above, this characterization is remarkably similar—and for the 
same reasons— to the tension between two worlds faced by Turkish villagers described 
by Szyliowicz (1966), Stirling (1965), and Makal (1954). The ambiguity of Turkey’s 
national identity has direct consequences in the international realm, particularly in the 
membership or denial of membership in international organizations that carry their own 
inherent identity, such as NATO, the European Union, the Islamic Conference 
Organization, and the Council of Europe. This ambiguity, often seen as a chameleon-like 
ability to play whatever role is needed at a particular time, is what is “so unsettling for
31 Such a struggle for identity is not confined to Turkey. In fact, one could argue that it is the basis of many 
conflicts around the world. In his War o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan, Frances Deng 
(1995:14) asserts that a “crisis of identity” lies at the root of the Sudanese conflict: ‘The source of conflict 
lies...in the degree to which the interacting identities and their overriding goals are mutually
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Europe. Turkey is seen as ‘an in-between place’” (Kevin Robins 1996:65; quoting 
Sullivan 1991:16). Such a liminal nature, while certainly “unsettling” for those observing 
it, is even more so for the Turks themselves, who must live it.32 ‘“What is Turkey? 
European? Islamic?’ [asked an Imam, or Islamic teacher], ‘What a pity for the Turkish 
people that they are bom of the Islamic religion: they study like the English; they are sent 
to jail under old Italian laws; and they are buried according to the rituals of Islam. What 
a pity! A terrible confusion’” (Kelsey 1996:157).33
Mehmet Ersoy, a resident in psychiatry studying for a year in the United States, 
notes the weak and fragmented nature of the idea of Turkey as a unified political entity, 
and instead invokes his Muslim identity. At the same time, he points out that there is a 
Turkish culture. In times of stress or homesickness, he finds that the Turkish culture (for 
him, this largely implies certain types of body language, manners, and music) is more 
comforting and familiar than the more general and diffuse Islamic identity (Ersoy 1997).
Turkey today presents a confusing mix of past and present, of topless beaches and 
ancient monuments, of mral pastoralism and urban shopping, a dazzling array of cliched 
polarities that fill many Turkish guidebooks. “Modem Turkey is struggling to hold itself 
together,” writes Tim Kelsey (1996:x), a journalist who visited Turkey in 1996. He 
describes a frustration with the compromise between East and West that has characterized 
much of the last several decades of Turkish history. “The blend of Turkish and European 
music and what that symbolized— cultural union with the West, equality with the West—
accommodating or incompatible” (ibid.:l); also see Kelsey 1996:x.
32 Mary Douglas (1966; esp. 41-57) wrote o f  the human discomfort with things which float between 
categories or are unclassifiable altogether; Victor Turner (1967:93-111) expanded on Arnold van Gennep’s 
(1960) conception of the dangerous and threatening nature of liminal states. Also see Kelsey 1996:x.
33 Islam continues today as a wellspring o f identity, particularly around such events as birth and death; 
Turkey’s legal system is fashioned after a European model, as is the educational system.
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does not make sense to most Turks anymore.” (ibid.:59).34 Throughout his travels in 
Turkey, Kelsey found that some people felt that national identity was something to be 
nurtured and treasured: ‘“It is important that we meet with other peoples. Then we will 
not lose touch with our Turkishness’”; ‘“Whatever city he’s from...he’s a child of our 
nation and you should not fight each other’” (ibid.:208; 181). On the other hand, 
Republic Day, commemorating the birth of the nation, is presented (both by Kelsey to his 
readers as well as by the Turks to themselves, apparently) almost as an afterthought, 
“when the nation reminds itself of its nationalism” (ibid.: 168); and the popular and 
controversial arabesk music, famous for its bitterly sad melodies, “articulated popular 
despondency. The arabesk said that something had gone very wrong indeed with 
Ataturk’s Republic. That is why the government took it so seriously” (ibid.:48). Kelsey 
describes a Turkey burning with ambiguity, rife with internal divisions, yet in many ways 
still clinging to an ideal vision of “Ataturk’s Republic.”
Identity issues are still argued in Turkey today, more than seventy years after 
Kemal began outlining the identity of the new nation. There is no clear idea of what 
Turkey is, or indeed of what it means to be Turkish; and identity remains an explicit 
source of confusion and debate. But, since the majority of those debates take place within 
the terms, and discourse, and framework, of a modem nation-state, the notion of Turkey- 
as-nation has become accepted. The Turks do not (any longer) argue about whether or 
not Turkey should become a nation, they argue about the nature of that nation.
But there is one important exception: the Kurds. As an ethnic group living in 
eastern Turkey and northwestern Iraq, the Kurds had organized what was ostensibly a
34Kelsey did not offer specifics (such as social class or age group, or even urban or rural groups) for the
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nationalist revolt (though which was more likely a “religious reaction against the 
secularizing reforms”) against the Kemalists in 1925. The new Turkish government 
reacted swiftly and decisively, sentencing the leaders of the revolt to death and executing 
them the next day (Lewis 1979:266, 410; also see Ziircher 1993:176-180). To this day, 
the Kurds continue to wage a civil war against Turkey and Iraq, fighting for an 
independent Kurdistan.35 The great length of this conflict, compounded by atrocities on 
both sides, unfortunately seems to preclude any pat resolution and calls into question the 
notion of Turkey as a viable, discrete nation-state.
Regardless of the denouement of the Kemalist reforms— and there is no reason to 
believe the story to be over—it is possible to state that Kemal, at a minimum, provided 
for the Turkish people a new identity that was to define them as Turks. Yet the people 
resisted this imposition, and continue to do so. Kemal underestimated, perhaps, the 
tenacity of traditional behavior and the identity to which it contributes. A more precise 
interpretation would be that he presented the Turks with the possibility of the new values, 
making it possible for those who wished to do so embrace the new identity. Even if that 
identity has since failed to become completely accepted throughout the nation, it remains
term “most Turks.” We should treat it as a subjective judgment by a visiting journalist, rather than a 
statement resulting from finely-detailed fieldwork.
35 The immediate future o f the movement, at this writing, seems uncertain: O^alan Bey, the leader of the 
Kurds, has been captured by Turkey, tried, and sentenced to death. While his appeal is pending, he has
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available for those who choose it; and the fact that there remains a nation at all points to 
at least a certain success of the reforms.
called for peace; a call the Kurdish forces appear, so far, to be following.
CONCLUSION
Turkish nationalism had an explicitly geographical component which 
differentiated it from the somewhat diffuse and vague pan-Turkism that preceded it and, 
to a certain extent, competed with it. Turkish nationalism also had an equally explicit 
ethnic component which distinguished it from the more general Ottomanism (which was 
based on the idea that a large-scale political loyalty took precedence over all others). 
Finally, Turkish nationalism had a fairly implicit secular component, which served to 
demarcate it from Islamism; an Islamism which, furthermore, would already fail the 
criteria of ethnic and geographic Turkish specificity.
When Turkism bloomed into Turkish nationalism and created the Republic of 
Turkey in 1923, it was only one in a long series of steps. The formation of the nation was 
not yet complete, as it lacked a coherent identity. Mustafa Kemal and the other reformers 
set out to provide this identity as an alternative to the traditional Ottoman one which, they 
felt, was responsible for holding Turkey back from the modem world. Despite extensive 
resistance, the Kemalist reforms were largely successful, if  only by one measure: 
Turkey remains a country today, albeit one beset by identity issues on the individual and 
national levels.
36 Kemal sometimes enforced the new values brutally. For example, in 1925 a Tribunal o f Independence 
executed forty-seven people for involvment with a dervish uprising to restore Islamic law. Later that year 
Kemal dissolved dervish brotherhoods altogether. 1925 also saw the Law for the Maintenance o f Order, 
which essentially gave the goverment dictatorial powers for four years (Lewis 1979:266; also see 410-412).
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The events in Turkey may fruitfully be envisioned as comprising two aspects of 
nationhood. The first is the group, or those that make up the nation. The second is the 
identity of this group. One cannot exist for long without the other, just as a nation cannot 
exist for long without an identity; if identity, at its most basic level, is that which 
distinguishes individuals and groups, then it is only relevant as a relational concept: the 
Self requires the Other. As the Turkish Nationalist forces fought for independence after 
the end of World War I, they were defining themselves, in a sense, by means of marking 
who was an enemy (any who opposed their drive for nationhood, as Kemal made clear in 
1921 [Kemal 1929 cited in Macfie 1994:124]).
Years of pan-Turkist rhetoric, of Turcologist research, of an Empire that was 
shrinking geographically as well as ethnically to the specific territories of the Turks—  
because of all of these, the Turkish people held a certain self-awareness by the end of 
World War I, though, significantly, there was no clear understanding as to the nature of 
their group. What Kemal provided was the necessary second part: the identity of that 
group, through a series of reforms aimed at tangible manifestations of the more elusive 
values he felt were hindering the modernization Turkey so desperately needed. The 
Kemalists focused on changing these values as a means of prescribing the new identity 
for the people of the new nation. Thus the imposition of modernity was, for the Turkish 
people, more than anything else a revolution in values. Recall that identity, despite my 
treatment of it here as largely a static thing, is more of an action, an ongoing process. 
This introduces a new level of complexity into the examination. For example, can it be 
said that the individual identity of a Turk bom at the end of the 19th century changed as 
he or she lived through the end of the Ottoman Empire and development of the Turkish
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nation? The group identity of the Turks was more clearly defined, that much is clear. But 
the Turkish people had their own individual identities prior to 1923, and continued to 
have them afterwards as well. What is the relationship between a previously-established 
individual identity and that individual’s place in a group; a group which, furthermore, 
went from being ill-defined to very sharply defined by the Kemalists? And we might well 
ask questions of the nature of identity itself. Is it quantifiable? Can a person or group lose 
an identity? Or simply change it to something else?
Future scholarship might also elaborate on my implied relationship between 
values and identity, and between values and the larger culture. The difficulty—for Kemal 
as well as for students of Turkish history—is that values are intangible, and often difficult 
to elucidate. Any study of values, particularly when concerned with how those values 
change, would benefit from a rigorous semiotic analysis. For example, rather than a 
general decree of secularism, Kemal outlawed the traditional fez, had the Koran 
translated from the sacred Arabic into vernacular Turkish, and abolished the office of the 
caliphate. These changes in themselves are not secularism, though they imply it, and a 
semiotic analysis might, among other things, explore the ways in which the people were 
aware the larger issues that the changes implied. Going beyond issues specific to the 
Kemalist reforms, such an approach might well ask: what is the relationship between 
values such as modernity, secularism, or morality, and the encouragement of these by 
means of enforceable laws?
Identity theory may be applied to questions of nationhood and nationalism; as I 
briefly touch on here, national identity not only plays a fundamental role in nationalism, 
it is a widespread concern in the modem world. What makes a group of people think of
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itself as a group? How relevant are theories of individual and group social identity to 
questions of large-scale group and national identity? The discussion here suggests that 
nationalism might be neither primordial and essentialist nor utilitarian and constructed. 
Rather, it might be a political manifestation of an inherently human tendency to form into 
groups; a drive for collective shared identity that has at times taken the form of the tribe, 
the kin group, or the kingdom. This particular group (the nation), though characterized by 
a political aspect, nevertheless shares many aspects of social groups which allow us to 
apply to it theories of identity originally intended for, and tested on, smaller groups. 
Developing an understanding of Turkish nationalism on this framework might be 
generalizable for other situations.
For example, can we apply the two-aspect conception of Turkey’s nationhood to 
other cases? What about areas which are currently struggling for independence, 
nationhood, or even a discrete identity? Can we tease out any sort of tangible changes 
that can be made (or avoided, for that matter) to help a group of people develop an 
independent identity? This applies not just to nations and irredentist groups, but to 
communities on almost any scale, from ethnic groups to civic organizations to the family.
One thing is clear: between the large number of world regions struggling with 
identity issues, and the prevalence of nationalistic ideologies, many of them violent, 
throughout the world, some clear, practice-oriented synthesis of identity, nationalism, and 
nationhood is needed, if not for the sake of the knowledge itself, than at least to help 
minimize some of the human suffering that can accompany such struggles. For example, 
if  it is found that many groups struggling for independence do so by establishing a suite 
of cultural and political values different from that of other groups around them, and
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subsquently engage in violent hostilities with those other groups, a resolution to the 
conflict might be found not in legal or political settlements but in those competing value 
structures themselves. Lending credence to this scenario are the large number of world 
conflicts that fail to be resolved by traditional diplomacy and standard peace agreements.
This paper should be seen as a beginning, a preliminary and small-scale 
exploration of what happens when a group of people becomes a nation-state, how a 
nation knows who it is, whether such an identity is possible or desirable, and the 
implications of other competing identities. Situated geographically as well as politically 
between East and West, Turkey continues to experience a troubled confusion of identity. 
The Kemalist reforms, so vigorously conceived and applied, have been resisted in many 
areas, particularly as a democratic system makes it easier for alternate viewpoints to 
flourish than it had been under Kemal’s government. Such freedom of identity—no 
longer are the Turkish people required to be Ottoman Muslims, or Kemalist secularists, 
conservatives or liberals, traditionalists or reformers— such freedom of identity, laced 
with a certain ambiguity, comes at the expense of stability and certainty.
The pressing question is this: is this freedom, so jealously celebrated by the West, 
worth its attendant ambiguity, worth the frustrating liminal sensation of living in two 
worlds but belonging completely to neither (see Philip Robins 1991:114-115) that so 
troubles modem Turkey? And if the freedom is not worth it, what then? Does a pluralistic 
system preclude any definite sort of stable identity? Or is it possible to maintain a stable 
group definition while stopping short of an autocratically enforced (or implemented, e.g. 
ethnic cleansing) identity? This question rises like abattoir smoke from conflicts around 
the world. Yet it remains unanswered.
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